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ST. THOMAS'S CHANGING ESTIMATE OF AVICENNA'S TEACHING ON EXISTENCE AS AN ACCIDENT

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In the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas there is frequent reference—sometimes implied, sometimes clearly expressed—to existence as accidental to created quiddities. "I can understand what a man or a phoenix is, without knowing whether they have an existence in reality." [1] The same notion recurs constantly in the works of Avicenna, to whom St. Thomas frequently acknowledges his indebtedness on this score. And yet in his later writings in which references to existence as an accident still occur, St. Thomas seems gradually to have modified his opinion, not on the doctrine itself but on the use of Avicenna as an authority for it. Why did he at first interpret the Arabian philosopher's words in a favorable light and end by seeing in his statements on this subject only falsity and contradiction? Did St. Thomas's final estimate of Avicenna's doctrine on existence as an accident correspond to the latter's real teaching?

Over a period of approximately eighteen years St. Thomas in eight texts invokes the Arabian's authority when noting that existence is extrinsic to the adequate concept of created essence. The first of these references in chronological order [2] occurs in the *Commentary on the Sentences* dating from about 1255. Here St. Thomas, discussing the

question, "Is existence properly predicated of God?" answers as follows:

> 'He who exists' is among all names the one most proper to God. . . . A reason can be drawn from Avicenna's words: Since in everything which exists there is to be considered its quiddity, by which it subsists in a determined nature, and its existence by which it is said to be in act, the name 'thing' is given it from its quiddity, according to Avicenna; and the name 'which exists' . . . is given from the act of existing. But in anything created, essence differs from existence, and so the creature is properly named from its quiddity and not from the act of existing. . . . But in God existence is His quiddity: accordingly a name taken from existence is proper to Him.[3]

According to Avicenna, then, objects are named from what marks each off as determined in nature or essence, not from something which is merely accidental. But the creature is specified and determined by its quiddity, the existence being other than the quiddity and accidental to it. In God, however, existence is not accidental to quiddity; His quiddity is existence, and so "existent" is His proper name.

A little later, in the *De Ente et Essentia*, existence is again described as extrinsic to any given essence conceived as such.

> It is true to say that man precisely as man has existence neither in this or that singular nor in the mind. Hence man's nature, absolutely considered, abstracts from any kind of existence.[4]

Although Avicenna is not mentioned in this citation, his authority is invoked at the beginning of the chapter from which it is taken, and Roland-Gosselin has shown that the text of the *De Ente* here closely

[1]*De Ente et Essentia*, cap. 4; ed. Roland-Gosselin (Paris: J. Vrin, 1948), p. 34.

[2]This is according to Mandonnet's arrangement which, in general, is undisputed as regards St. Thomas's earlier works. See Louis De Raeymaeker, *Introduction to Philosophy*, trans. Harry McNeill (New York: Joseph F. Wagner, 1948), pp. 259-63.

[3]*In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1.

[4]*De Ente*, cap. 3; ed. Roland-Gosselin, p. 26.

[5]Avicenna, *Metaphys.*, V, 1 and 2 (cited by Roland-Gosselin, *De Ente*, p. 24 n.).

[6]*Ibid.*, 2 (p. 25 n.).

[7]*De Ente*, cap. 4; ed. Roland-Gosselin, pp. 33-34.

follows Avicenna's discussion of the same point in the *Shifa'*[5] where the following parallel is found:

> Animal, as it exists in sensible things or in the mind as something understood, is 'animal' [essence] plus something else not animal [existence]. . . . Clearly, since it is animal plus something else not animal, animal [essence] will then be in this [composite] as its part. Yet animal [essence] can be considered in itself, even though it is [conjoined] with something [existence] other than itself; for its essence is with something other than it. . . . But to be with something else [existence] is accidental to it or something that accompanies its nature . . .[6]

In the next chapter of the same treatise, St. Thomas, after mentioning Avicenna as his authority in a related problem (essential composition in material things), speaks of the composition of essence and existence proper to all creatures.

> The essences [substantial forms] of composite things, by being received into . . . matter, are multiplied. . . . But since the essence of something simple is not received in matter, no such multiplication is possible . . . but in this case there are as many species as there are individuals, as Avicenna explicitly says. Yet such substances . . . are not wholly simple . . . but have a mixture of potency. . . . For whatever is not of the concept of an essence . . . comes from without and enters into composition with the essence. . . . Now, every essence . . . can be understood without anything being understood of its existence. . . . Clearly, then, existence is something other than essence . . . unless there be something whose quiddity is its very existence.[7]

Created essence, then, can be adequately understood independently of whether it exists. Hence as far as essence is concerned, existence is something "coming from without"; that is, outside the adequate concept and in that sense adventitious or accidental. The theme of existence as a "concomitant" or "accident" of created essence, as will be seen presently, is commonplace in Avicenna's works and recurs

whenever there is need of distinguishing the necessary being from the possibles.

The next reference to existence as an accident is found in *De Veritate*, composed between 1256 and 1259. In rejecting the theory that an angel knows material things by knowing his own essence, St. Thomas argues that a likeness of a material thing must come ultimately from the one who caused the material thing. But whatever one has from a cause is over and above one's essence; for example, existence in creatures is over and above their essence, and so creatures derive existence from a cause. Similarly, the likeness of a material thing is something over and above the essence of an angel and so must be caused in his essence by God.

The parallel drawn is between entitative act in created essence and the *species impressa* in the angelic essence. The existence which is conferred on created essence, as its act in the order of being, is a logical accident, since it is "over and above" and therefore adventitious to the essence; but in no sense is it a second formal act or predicamental accident. The *species impressa*, however, is both a logical accident (since it is over and above the angel's essence, which can be adequately understood without this particular *species*) and a predicamental accident of quality. The similarity between existence and any given *species impressa* in creatures lies in the fact that neither is part of the essence. This is the only point that St. Thomas wishes to make here, and it is his only reason for citing Avicenna. Later, after becoming convinced that the latter considered existence in creatures also as a predicamental accident, he will explicitly reject this supposedly Avicennian notion.

Avicenna's conception of existence as accidental to created essences is, therefore, in this context, introduced only as an example. The passage reads as follows:

> All that something has . . . from another is over and above its

[8]*De Veritate*, q. 8, a. 8.

[9]Mandonnet puts *Quodlibet* IX between 1256 and 1259, Pelster between 1260 and 1265, and Glorieux in 1257. See De Raeymaeker, *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 260.

[10]*Quodlibet.*, IX, a. 6, ad 4.

[11]Mandonnet's dates for the *De Potentia* are 1259-63, Grabmann's 1265-67, and both Van Steenberghen's and Glorieux's 1265-68. See De Raeymaeker, *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 260, and Etienne Gilson, *Le thomisme* (5th ed., Paris: J. Vrin, 1947), p. 534. The later dates are more likely.

[12]Maurice Bouyges, "L'idée génératrice du *De Potentia* de saint Thomas," *Revue de philosophie*, II (1931), 128-31, 247-67 (cited by Beatrice Zedler, "Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the 'De Potentia Dei,'" *Traditio*, VI (1948), 107-9.

essence, and so Avicenna proves that the existence of each thing, except the first being, is over and above its essence, because all [creatures] have existence from another.[8]

Several years later in *Quodlibet IX*[9] St. Thomas once more makes reference to Avicenna's placing of existence outside the concept of created essence, but here for the last time with unqualified approval. The objection is raised that angels must be composed of matter and form. In the logical order, one might argue, the specific difference is the determining principle and the genus the determinable. Difference has its origin in form; but, since an angel is noncomposite in essence, the only determining principle possible in him is existence. On the other hand the difference of a thing is part of its essence and must enter into the definition of the essence. But

> . . . in every creature existence differs from essence and does not enter into its definition, as Avicenna says. Therefore the difference of an angel cannot come from its existence.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Granted, for the difference comes, not from existence, but rather from the relation of the substance itself to existence.[10]

St. Thomas grants the objection because, as he has already shown in his answer to the previous difficulty, essence in an angel is not matter in the proper sense but can be compared with matter insofar as it is a potential principle in the order of being, just as matter is such a principle in the essence of material things. But in the logical order the genus of angels is taken from the nature of their substance—created and determinable intellectuality. Each angel is differentiated by the proportion his substance bears to existence, one angel having more potency capable of actuation, another less.

It is in the *De Potentia*, composed between 1265 and 1268,[11] that St. Thomas first makes a distinction regarding Avicenna's teaching that existence is accidental to created essence. It is not surprising that reserve should appear for the first time in this work, if, as Father Maurice Bouyges, S.J., suggests,[12] the *De Potentia* was intended by its author as an attack on Avicenna and his Neoplatonic theory of emana-

tion which explained the origin of finite beings as a necessary overflowing from the One.

Taking up the question of whether things created will ever be annihilated, St. Thomas proposes and answers a difficulty based on a teaching of Avicenna and St. Hilary of Poitiers that, since existence in creatures is accidental, no creature will exist forever. The answer merely distinguishes the two senses of accident, the logical accident (which can be but is not necessarily permanent) and the predicamental accident.

> Nothing which exists accidentally is infinite. But existence belongs accidentally to every creature, as Avicenna says. And so Hilary, too, to distinguish God from the creature says: For God existence is not an accident. Therefore no creature will last forever. . . . Response: If we speak of the existence of a substance, existence is not said to be an accident in the genus of [predicamental] accident (for it is the act of an essence), but [existence is an accident] by a certain similarity, because it is not part of the essence, just as a [logical] accident is not.[13]

Several years later in the *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics*[14] St. Thomas expresses doubt about the correctness of Avicenna's teaching on this same point. Now the Arabian's statement that existence is other than created essence and therefore entering into composition with it is interpreted to mean that existence is added just as a predicamental accident is added to substance. This cannot be, says St. Thomas, because existence is not an accidental act but the substantial act of essence and is proportioned to its essence as act is to potency.

> Avicenna . . . said . . . that . . . being signifies not the substance of a thing but something added. He spoke so of being,

[13]*De Potentia*, q. 5, a. 4, ad 3.

[14]Mandonnet dates this work from 1265, Grabmann from 1271-72, Mansion not before 1271. See De Raeymaeker, *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 261. Grabmann's estimate is more probable. See Angelus Walz, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Sebastian Bullough (Westminster: Newman Press, 1951), p. 121.

[15]*In IV Metaph.*, lect. 2, nn. 556 and 558. Gilson in *Le thomisme*, p. 58, n. 1, comments on the use of *quasi*.

[16]Mandonnet places this work between 1269 and 1272, Pelster in 1272-73. De Raeymaeker, *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 260.

[17]*Metaphysics*, VIII, 6 (1045 b 2). St. Thomas quotes this text elsewhere; for example, in *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 61, a. 1, ad 2.

[18]*Quodlibet.*, XII, q. 5, a. 1.

because in everything which has existence from another the existence of the thing is other than its essence.

. . . . . .

But . . . he does not seem to have spoken correctly. For the existence of a thing, though other than its essence, should nevertheless not be thought of as something superadded like an accident. Existence is rather, so to speak, constituted by the principles of the essence.[15]

The final reference to Avicenna in connection with the question of existence as an accident occurs in *Quodlibet* XII, composed not long before the death of its author in 1274.[16] After asking whether existence in an angel is accidental, St. Thomas cites Avicenna's axiom that "one" and "existent" are always such. Apparently Avicenna is merely repeating Aristotle's teaching that in immaterial beings neither "existent" nor "one" is to be found in their definitions,[17] from which it would follow that existence and unity, being outside the adequate concept of the essence, would be predicated of such beings as logical accidents. In his earlier works, as has been seen, St. Thomas always interpreted Avicenna in this latter sense, but now he understands him to mean that existence in an angel is a predicamental accident—which opinion, of course, he rejects absolutely.

Is the existence of an angel his accident? Avicenna's opinion was that *one* and *being* always signify an accident. But this is not true, because *one*, as convertible with being, indicates the substance of a thing, just as *being* does.

. . . . . .

As for Hilary's saying, I answer that an accident in a broad sense is said to be anything not part of the essence—for example, existence in created things—for in God alone is existence His essence.[18]

The period, then, in which St. Thomas shows increasing disapproval of Avicenna's teaching on existence as accidental to created essence would fall roughly between 1265 and 1273. Finally, as has been seen, he is unwilling to make in Avicenna's favor a distinction which he

made even in *De Potentia* and which he is here still willing to make in favor of Hilary. Moreover, at least twice in *Quodlibet* II, written during the latter part (1269-72) of this same period, he himself set forth the doctrine which, in the last three texts above cited, he refused to admit as Avicenna's. There, in the first article of the second question, St. Thomas asks: Is an angel substantially composed of essence and existence? After answering affirmatively he notes in the body of the response that existence is not part of the definition of anything created but outside the essence, and continues:

> Since everything outside the essence of a thing is called an accident, existence . . . is an accident. So the Commentator [Averroes] says that the proposition, "Socrates is," belongs to accidental predication.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> As for the second objection [that no accident enters into substantial composition] I answer that existence is an accident, not like a [predicamental] accident but as the actuality of every substance . . .[19]

Averroes, of course, regarded "existent" in the example as a logical accident of Socrates and constantly argued against Avicenna's teaching of existence being really distinct from created essence.

In the next article of the same work St. Thomas contrasts existence in God and creatures. In God it is identified with essence, but in an angel existence is not part of his essence but accidental to it. An angel, moreover, has other logical accidents, such as any particular act of the intellect or will, which belong to his supposit and are separable from it in somewhat the same manner as existence, as entitative act, belongs to created essence and is really distinct from it.

> In God alone there is found no accident in addition to His essence, since His existence is His essence . . . but not . . . so

[19]*Ibid.*, II, q. 2, a. 1.

[20]*Ibid.*, a. 2. Cf. *De Anima*, a. 12, ad 7.

[21]*De Ente*, ed. Roland-Gosselin, p. xxi.

[22]Averroes, *In IV Metaph.*, cap. 2, com. 3 (cited by Aimé Forest, *La structure métaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas d'Aquin* [2nd ed. Paris: J. Vrin, 1956]), p. 41.

[23]Averroes, *Destructio Destructionum* (Venetiis, 1550), fol. 34 v. (cited by Zedler, *Traditio*, VI, 156, n. 57).

[24]Zedler, *Traditio*, VI, 152.

[25]Averroes, *Disp. Metaphys.*, V, p. 176 r. (cited by Forest, *La structure métaphysique*, p. 143, n. 2).

[26]Munk, *Maimonide, Guide des égarés*, I, 231, n. *a* (cited by Forest, *La structure métaphysique*, p. 143, n. 1).

> in an angel. In addition to his specific essence there is something accidental to him, for the existence of an angel is over and above his essence or nature. He has other accidents too, all belonging to the supposit but not to the nature.[20]

Existence, then, is a constituent and necessary part of the formal supposit, actuated and individual; but it is accidental to a finite essence which can be adequately conceived without existence.

The reference to Averroes in *Quodlibet* II, q. 2, a. 1, also points to the reason for St. Thomas's growing opposition to this teaching of Avicenna. The latter strongly influenced the thought of St. Thomas's earlier writings, especially the *Commentary on the Sentences* and *De Ente et Essentia*.[21] But in his later works, at least regarding existence and unity in creatures, St. Thomas seems gradually to have sided with Averroes's accusation that "Avicenna erred greatly in saying that one and being signify dispositions added to the essence of a thing."[22] Apparently convinced that Avicenna considered the two principles of finite being as really separable, Averroes had concluded that the only alternative was to deny any kind of real distinction between them.[23] Moreover, in purporting to present Avicenna's doctrine, he had made it appear that the latter held existence to be a real predicamental accident of essence and indicated, as the source of Avicenna's error, his confusing of the logical with the real order.[24]

> To say that existence is added to the quiddity . . . is an extremely fallacious assertion because from this it follows that the name of being signifies an accident common to the ten predicaments outside the mind. And this is Avicenna's opinion.[25]

Averroes had even supplied an etymological reason for Avicenna's supposed confusion—the fact that the Arabic philosophical term for existent being, *mawjud*, is a passive participle of "to find" and so might be thought to indicate some kind of real accident.[26] St. Thomas in his later works and the Scholastics in general adopted this interpretation of Avicenna's doctrine and rejected the notion, attributed to him, of existence as a predicamental accident of essence.

But Averroes seems to have drawn from certain statements of

Avicenna meanings which the latter never intended and his original words do not support. The misinterpretation in question here is all the more striking because Avicenna himself had warned against confusing the two kinds of accident:

> The property and the common accident are among the accidental predicates. . . . An example of the common accident is "white" with a man of the white race. . . . Some modern logicians [the Arabs, as contrasted with the Greeks, the ancients] think that this accident is the one mentioned as opposed to substance, but it is by no means so. . . . These five expressions, genus, species, difference, property, and common accident . . . are attributed to particular things which are their [logical] inferiors.[27]

Moreover, to be a predicamental accident, being would have to be one of the supreme genera capable of univocal predication of its own inferiors. But Avicenna repeatedly denies that existence can be considered in this light.

> The existence which is not in itself a quiddity . . . is not a genus for anything.[28]
>
> In these categories existence is distinguished from essence, because the existence is accidental, not essential. . . . Existence, then, is neither the genus nor the property nor anything else of these ten categories.[29]

[27]Ibn Sina, *Livre des directives et remarques*, trans. A. M. Goichon (Paris: J. Vrin, 1951), pp. 100-102.

[28]Ibn Sina, *'Uyun al-hikmah* (Al-Qahirah: Al-M'had ul'ilmi il-Faransi, 1954), Al-ilahiyat, 5, p. 53.

[29]Avicenna, *Le livre de science*, trans. Mohammad Achena et Henri Massé (Paris: "Les Belles Lettres," 1955), p. 116.

[30]Ibn Sina, *Livre des directives et remarques*, p. 369.

[31]*De unitate*, ed. Parma, Vol. 16, p. 215, col. 2. Expressions like "Averroes perverse exponit," "Peripateticae philosophiae depravator," recur constantly throughout this opuscule.

[32]The first major philosophical work of Avicenna is the *Shifa'* ("Remedy") which contains four principal parts dealing with logic, physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. The *Najat* ("Salvation") is an abridgment of the *Shifa'*, following its order and sometimes reproducing its text. The third and last, *Kitab al-isharat wa't-tanbihat* ("Book of Directives and Remarks"), follows the plan of the *Shifa'* but substitutes a treatise on mysticism for that on mathematics. Besides these three major works, Avicenna composed a large number of minor philosophical treatises. One of these latter, *Danesh-name* ("Book of Knowledge"), written in Persian, synopsizes the contents of the *Shifa'* but follows a different order. Chronologically it comes between the *Najat* and *Kitab al-isharat*. *'Uyun al-hikmah* ("Sources of Wisdom"), written in Arabic in the last years of his life, briefly summarizes his philosophical thought, following the order of the *Shifa'*.

[33]Avicenna, *Metaphys.*, V, 2 (cited in *De Ente*, ed. Roland-Gosselin, p. 25, n.).

> Since actual existence is not one of the categories known as a genus, it does not become, by a relation established between it and a negative idea [that which is not in an actual subject, viz., accident], a genus belonging to something. For certainly existence, not being a constituent of quiddities but one of their concomitants, does not become a part of the constituent merely by not being in a subject.[30]

It is hardly credible, therefore, that a philosopher of the stature of Averroes failed to grasp the true sense of Avicenna's conception of existence as accidental in finite beings. It is more likely that his account of the latter's teaching on this point is another example of what St. Thomas himself accused him of in *De Unitate Intellectus contra Averroistas*—a deliberate perversion of another's thought. "Averroes . . . deliberately misinterpreted the words of Alexander, just as he took those of Themistius in a way contrary to his intended sense." [31]

Avicenna, then, warned in general of the danger of confusing real accidents, opposed to substance, with logical accidents, opposed to constituents of created essence adequately conceived. Moreover, by denying that existence is a genus, he excluded the possibility of regarding it as a predicament. On these grounds alone any interpretation of his words that would make existence a real accident seems indefensible. But the Arabian philosopher still more explicitly, both in his more important works, the *Shifa'* and *Kitab al-isharat wa't-tanbihat*, and in his minor treatises, *'Uyun al-hikmah* and *Danesh-name*,[32] treats created existence as a logical accident, associating it with the other predicables and contrasting it with the constituents of any particular finite essence.

Reference has already been made to the passage in the *Shifa'* in which the accidental relation of existence to essence in finite beings is proposed.

> Animal, as it exists in sensible things or in the mind . . . is animal [essence] and something else not animal. . . . But to be with something else is accidental to it.[33]

The same point is developed more fully in *Kitab al-isharat*:

> Everything possessing a quiddity is ascertained to exist in individuals or is merely conceived in the mind. . . . If it has an essence which does not exist by one of these two existences and is not constituted by one of them, then "existence" is a concept related to its essence as a concomitant or otherwise. . . . If existence were a constituent of humanity, it would be impossible to conceive humanity in the mind as deprived of what would be its constitutive part.[34]

In the chapter immediately following this description of finite essence in its relation to existence, Avicenna explains the sense in which he understands "concomitant" (*lazim*):

> As for the nonconstituent concomitant, which is properly named concomitant (even though the constituent is also a concomitant), it is that which accompanies the quiddity without being part of it.[35]

The "concomitant" may be compared, on the one hand, with the constituent, inasmuch as both are inseparable from the essence, and, on the other, with the accident, insofar as both concomitant and accident are over and above the essence adequately conceived.[36] Existence is a concomitant in both respects, since it is inseparable from the essence of any actual finite individual and yet not part of that essence considered precisely in itself.

Composed not long before its author's death in 1037, *'Uyun al-hikmah* represents a later stage of his philosophical thought than

[34]Ibn Sina, *Livre des directives et remarques*, pp. 87-88. The *Najat* has a parallel passage, "Existence is not owed to a thing (that begins to be) in itself" (Avicenna, *Metaphysices Compendium*, trans. Nematallah Carame [Rome: Pontifical Institute of Oriental Studies, 1926], p. 63).

[35]Ibn Sina, *Livre des directives et remarques*, p. 89. Cf. S. Thomas, *In V Metaph.*, lect. 22, no. 1142.

[36]See A. M. Goichon, *Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sina* (Paris: Desclée-de Brouwer, 1938), p. 367.

[37]Ibn Sina, *'Uyun al-hikmah*, "al-ilahiyat," 5, p. 58. On the translation of *'anniyah* as "actuation," see Carame's translation, p. 113, n. 1. A. M. Goichon, *Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sina*, p. 9, believes that Avicenna was not precise in his use of the term; but here, by explicitly making it a synonym of existence, he leaves no doubt about its meaning. Achena and Massé also translate the word by "existence" (Avicenna's *Livre de science*, p. 116). Cf. Ibn Sina, *Livre des directives*, p. 365, n. 2.

[38]*Livre de science*, pp. 147-48. Compare the citation from the same source referred to in note 29.

do the two works just mentioned. In the final chapter of this brief treatise, Avicenna contrasts caused being with the self-existent and says of the latter:

> Because he is not divisible in any way, he has neither part nor genus. Since he has no genus, he has no specific difference. And because quiddity is his actuation (I mean the existence), it is not a quiddity to which existence is accidental.[37]

The import of this passage, which deals with predicables, shows that the term "accidental," which in the last clause is predicated of existence, is to be understood as referring to a logical accident. The clear implication is that in beings whose quiddity is not their existence, existence, in the order of predicables, is a logical accident.

In the *Danesh-name*, finally, perhaps more definitely than elsewhere, Avicenna plainly distinguishes logical from predicamental accidents and classes existence in finite beings with the former:

> The Necessary Being is not a [predicamental] substance and is not part of any category. The reason is that the existence of all the categories is accidental and joined to the quiddity, in which it is not contained. But the existence of the Necessary Being is His very quiddity. Therefore it is evident that the Necessary Being, having no genus, has also no specific difference, and consequently no definition.[38]

In brief, then, existence in finite beings is outside the adequate concept of the essence; and therefore, in relation to the essence, existence is extrinsic, adventitious, and in that sense accidental. Hence Avicenna, despite the doctrine attributed to him by Averroes, does not teach that existence is a predicamental accident like quantity or quality; but he equivalently states that any given finite being is fully understandable even though not thought of as existing, and that existence is thus never part of its definition. Existence, then, may be conceived as present or absent while the finite essence remains unaltered.

Such teaching did not originate with Avicenna. Alfarabi explicitly taught that "existence is not a constitutive character; it is

only an accessory accident."[39] Aristotle implies as much when he distinguishes human nature as one thing and human existence as another[40] and says that the term "existent" is not present in the definition of finite beings without matter.[41]

The word "accident" as here used cannot, of course, be understood in any other order but that of predication, as Avicenna himself warned. In the physical order existence is not an accident but the act of the passive potency, essence, to which it is transcendentally related.

It is precisely in this latter relation that the disagreement between St. Thomas and Avicenna has its root. Although Avicenna seems to have come close to it, he never explicitly formulated the relationship of finite essence, as subjective passive potency, to existence as act to which the essence is positively ordered. Analyzing finite essence and realizing that existence is not contained in its adequate concept, he logically concludes that existence is conferred from without by creative activity. Saying that existence in such a case comes from without does not mean that it is added as a predicamental accident but merely indicates its origin from an efficient cause. This analysis of finite being is proposed in two passages of *'Uyun al-hikmah*:

> What is in itself possible does not have existence from itself. Otherwise it itself would necessarily be from itself. Consequently its existence is from another.[42]
>
> That which begins to be has existence after it did not exist. Its existence after nonexistence is not the [substantial] act of the efficient cause. But its existence depends exclusively on something else, since in itself it [whatever begins to be] has only this—that it did not exist. Hence, if the existence depends on something else and if it is impossible that existence should derive from a cause which is not the very act of existing, then the

[39]Cited by Gilson, *Le thomisme*, p. 55.

[40]*Analytica Posteriora*, Bk. II, chap. 7, 92b.

[41]*Metaphysics*, Bk. VIII, chap. 6, 1045b.

[42]*'Uyun al-hikmah*, 5, p. 55.

[43]*Ibid.*, 5, pp. 52-53.

[44]For example, the *Najat*, trans. Carame, pp. 37-38.

[45]Gilson, *Le thomisme*, p. 56, n. 1.

[46]*Najat*, trans. Carame, p. 37, n. 1.

[47]F. Ehrle, "L'Agostinismo e l'Aristotelismo nella Scolastica del secolo XIII." *Xenia Thomistica*, III (1925), p. 520 (cited in Aimé Forest, Fernand Van Steenberghen, and M. de Gandillac, *Le mouvement doctrinal du* IX^e^ *au* XIV^e^ *siècle*. Vol. 13 of Fliche et Martin, *Histoire de l'Eglise* [Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1951], p. 255, n. 3).

[48]Forest, Van Steenberghen, and de Gandillac, *Le mouvement doctrinal*, pp. 255-56, and Fernand Van Steenberghen, *The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century* (London: Nelson, 1955), p. 78.

existence must be ordered—as is evident—ultimately to the first [efficient] causes.[43]

In saying here and elsewhere[44] that a finite thing, if its essence alone is considered, has only nonexistence, Avicenna has opened himself to the charge of making finite essence indifferent instead of positively ordered to existence as potency to act.[45] He seems, however, merely to have wished, by stressing the fact that existence is never contained in the adequate concept of created essence, to show the ultimate need of a necessarily existent cause to explain the existence of finite beings.[46]

The Arabian philosopher's teachings differ from those of St. Thomas on many points, but existence as a predicable accident in finite beings is not among them. Why, then, did St. Thomas oppose Avicenna on this ground? Certainly the answer must take into account Averroes's misrepresentations, but the whole reason is not to be found there. St. Thomas was equally or more opposed to many of Averroes's doctrines and never accepted his strictures on Avicenna for the reasons which Averroes himself gave—reasons that always suppose the real identification of existence with created essence. Very probably the fuller motivation for St. Thomas's growing hostility towards Avicenna's teaching on this point must be sought in the light of the doctrinal conflict that occupied the latter years of the saint's life.

In point of fact, the gradual rejection of Avicenna's views parallels in time the growing polemic in the Church against heterodox Aristotelianism in general and Averroes and Avicenna in particular. Some set the starting point of this polemic as early as 1263, when Urban IV renewed the prohibition of Gregory IX against teaching Aristotle—in recognition, it is said, of the growing danger to orthodoxy offered by Arabian misinterpretations of his works.[47] Canon Van Steenberghen, however, regards this injunction as a mere manifestation of conservatism without relation to the real doctrinal situation then prevailing at Paris and maintains that the first reaction there to Neoplatonic Aristotelianism did not antedate 1265 or 1267.[48] In any case, it is roughly within this period, 1263-67, that St. Thomas first manifests disagreement with Avicenna on a teaching hitherto accepted, and this in the *De Potentia*, a work written, as seems likely,

in refutation of Avicennian Neoplatonism.[49] At the end of 1268, St. Thomas was recalled to Paris and there, until 1272, he strenuously defended his doctrinal positions against the heterodox Aristotelianism of Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. The two works in which he finally rejects Avicennian teaching on existence in relation to finite essence are also the products of this period—the *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics* dating from 1271-72 and *Quodlibet* XII from 1272-73. The opposition to Avicenna on this subject, beginning in *De Potentia* and accentuated during the period of controversy with Siger, is the more understandable in view of the fact that Siger himself drew at least as much upon Avicenna as he did upon Averroes.[50] There seems good foundation, then, to regard this change of attitude on the part of St. Thomas as part of the larger battle waged against Arabian philosophy and the heterodox interpretations of Aristotle which it largely inspired.

Avicenna, as has been seen, never seems to have conceived the relation of essence to existence as that of subjective potency to its actuating principle in the order of being. Some, as has been noted, have held that this lacuna in his thought led him to make finite essence indifferent instead of positively ordered to existence.[51] St. Thomas's developing insight into the essentialism that would follow from such a view of finite being would then have provoked, in his later works, the less benevolent interpretation of Avicenna's statements regarding the accidental character of existence in created things. It may well be that such considerations influenced St. Thomas, but his aversion seems also to be part of the general reaction against the dangerous errors of heterodox Aristotelianism which drew its inspiration both from Avicenna and Averroes. The parallel chronology of the doctrinal disputes at Paris and of St. Thomas's philosophical writing in the latter years of his life would seem to impose some such conclusion.

[49]Grabmann dates *De Potentia* from 1265-67, Van Steenberghen and Glorieux from 1265-68. Mandonnet allows the year of Urban's prohibition, 1263, as the latest date, but this is probably too early. See note 11 and Walz, *St. Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 104 and 121.

[50]Forest, *Le Mouvement doctrinal*, pp. 278, 281-82; and Fernand Van Steenberghen, *The Philosophical Movement in the 13th Century*, p. 80.

[51]Gilson, *Le thomisme*, p. 56. n. 1; and Zedler, *Traditio*, VI, 154-57.

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SARVEPALLI RADHAKRISHNAN AND JNANA

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II

Some Critical Remarks

A

In General

Effective exposition means criticism and evaluation. Dr. Radhakrishnan himself does not think it necessary to abstain from criticism in order that he may give a fair and impartial statement.[1] If so, he will certainly allow us also to make a few remarks on his view of experience and of reality. It is not easy to be comprehensive and impartial; but one can be sincere, broad-minded, and imaginative in the consideration of views with which one is not in sympathy or agreement.[2] Still more encouraging is that Dr. Radhakrishnan himself, as a true and unselfish *guru*, or teacher, exhorts us to discuss freely not merely concepts by postulation but also concepts by intuition.[3] "We would be unworthy disciples if we do not question and criticise our masters . . . and think for ourselves."[4] He himself gives us the lead.

> Loyalty to ourselves, to our intellect and conscience, requires us to withhold our assent from propositions which do not commend themselves to our conscience and judgment. We must respect our own dignity as rational beings and thus diminish the power of fraud. It is essential that we should subject religious beliefs (and experiences as these too are just beliefs ultimately) to the scrutiny of reason.[5]

It is just this that I shall try to do.

Now, philosophy is defined by Radhakrishnan as "a logical inquiry into the nature of reality."[6] And as it is natural to man to philosophize—at least implicitly—he justly argues against Swami A. Bharati and other logical positivists when he says: "Metaphysical emptiness does not exist, for it is itself a metaphysics, a sceptical metaphysics. To refuse to philosophise is in itself a kind of philosophy."[7]

Again we must grant that philosophy is a sustained attempt to understand the universe as a whole and not merely some sections of it, as other sciences do.[8] It must be a synthetic and coherent view of the whole of reality; it must interpret and co-ordinate all the significant aspects of experience. It must reckon, therefore, with religious experience also.[9] *Philosophia est scientia rerum omnium.*

Moreover, it is true that philosophy in its fullness is not just logical reflection; it is love of wisdom. *Sophia, jnana*—wisdom—is not mere knowledge; it is knowledge loved and lived; it is a way of life in which valid knowledge is the condition of just action.[10] And it it is genuine love of true wisdom, it will naturally lead the student to a life of true religion and love. Dr. Radhakrishnan decries all sham religions: "Almost all of us deny God's existence in everything we do. We bow down before the world, flesh and power."[11] If we are religious, he justly exhorts, we must live our religion. If we do not live our religion, our religion is a phantasy or a documentation.[12]

Dr. Radhakrishnan does not cease to act as a philosopher even while appealing to the *scruti* or the Vedas as *an* authoritative source of knowledge. This appeal to the Vedas, he says, does not involve any reference

[1]*Indian Philosophy* (1923), I, 9. *The Philosophy of S. Radhakrishnan*, ed. P. V. Schilpp ("Library of Living Philosophers Series," No. 8. New York: Tudor Pub. Co., 1952), p. 815.
[2]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 815.
[3]*Ibid.*, p. 823.
[4]*Ibid.*, p. 8.
[5]*The Idealist View of Life* (1932), p. 219.
[6]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 816.
[7]*Ibid.*, p. 17.
[8]*Ibid.*, p. 789.
[9]*Ibid.*
[10]*Ibid.*, p. 817.
[11]*Ibid.*, p. 22.
[12]*Ibid.*, p. 23.
[13]*Indian Philosophy*, I, 51.
[14]*Ibid.*
[15]*Ibid.*, 129 f.
[16]*Idealist View of Life*, p. 89, and *The Heart of Hindustan* (1936), p. 48.
[17]Cf. *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 817.
[18]Cf. Radhakrishnan's reply to Swami A. Bharatti, *ibid.*, pp. 465, 814-20.
[19]Cf. *ibid.*, p. 817.
[20]Cf. "My Search for Truth" (offprint, 1948), p. 30.
[21]Cf. *Indian Philosophy*, II, 517.
[22]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 825.
[23]"The Spirit in Man," *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, ed. S. Radhakrishnan and J. H. Muirhead (1936), p. 486.
[24]The Modern Schoolman, XXXVI, 41-56.

to an extra-philosophical standard.[13] For the Vedas are only *aptavacanas*, the sayings of the wise. They are the experiences of seers more fortunate than the normal man, which we are called upon to accept [14] if we are convinced of the genuineness of the experience and of the veracity of the testimony. They are human testimony, the inspired creations of men as are poetry and art; they are not an infallible revelation.[15] Their authority, if any, is but the authority of facts.[16] Dr. Radhakrishnan would not hold beliefs simply because an authority, a scripture, church, or dictator announces them.[17] That is why he would like to be called not so much a "theologian of Hinduism" [18] as a "philosopher offering rational evidence in support of his conclusions." [19]

And even when Radhakrishnan appeals, as he often does, to intuition, integral knowledge, spiritual experience, he does not want to be an obscurantist.[20] He wants the intellect to be used as a critical weapon against all untested assumptions, to probe even scriptural views and spiritual experiences.[21] Even if the saving experience is ineffable, yet it is most rational; "the highest type of mysticism is most rational." [22] Thus even intuition is not independent of thought but emphatically dependent on it.[23]

In general, however, this may be said—and any intelligent student of philosophy will soon perceive it without much difficulty—that nearly all, or most, of Dr. Radhakrishnan's fundamental statements are true at least in some sense or other. They need, however, to be made philosophically more precise and complete. To do full justice, therefore, to Radhakrishnan, I should have analyzed and evaluated each one of his important propositions that I presented in Part I.[24] Given my scope and resources, though, I could not do so or even discuss in detail the various problems that call for a consistent solution in the author's writings. Hence, I content myself with asking a few questions and making a few remarks on his description of spiritual experience and on his interpretation of spiritual reality. Are not these two the basic and principal notion of our author's *jnana* or spiritual wisdom?

First and foremost, against all crudely materialistic and purely naturalistic theories, Dr. Radhakrishnan justly defends a new set of phenomena in man quite distinct from the physical or the vital or the merely conscious.[25] Unfortunately, however, he is content with merely stating facts and defending activities like a scientist; he does not enquire further like a philosopher into their distinctive ontological bases, even at the relatively real or pragmatic level.

Again, he is inclined on occasions to depreciate sensitive and intellectual knowledge; but he does this, I should say, only to bring into greater relief the need and fact of a higher knowledge that is integral. Sensitive knowledge, it is true, does not give us reality and truth formally and ontologically; but it must and does give them materially and ontically.[26] We must esteem and accept sensitive knowledge for what it is worth; otherwise all our scientific knowledge based on observations and experiments would be just castles in the air.

As regards intellectual knowledge, it seems to me somewhat arbitrary to limit, as Radhakrishnan does at times, intellectual knowledge to a mere discursive one, or, worse still, to equate it to a common, systematized scientific knoweldge of physical sciences such as physics, biology, astronomy, and so on. In this sense, surely man is more than pure reason. He has obviously intellectual apprehensions of primary objective realities, of first principles of thought and of conduct, of internal concrete facts, of the act of existing, *esse*, in the act of judgment, and so on, though by reflexion he often tries to confirm them by sound reasoning too. We would gladly, therefore, repeat with Radhakrishnan that any sound rationalism will recognize the need of some sort of intuition.[27] Even while we confess that normally and naturally we have no strictly intuitive intellectual

[25] *Idealist View of Life*, p. 262.

[26] St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, q. 1, a. 9.

[27] "Spirit in Man," p. 485.

[28] "Semper supremum infimi ordinis attingit infimum supremi, ut patet per Dionysium" (St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, a. 2).

[29] "Personally, I use intuition for integral (non-inferential, non-hearsay) knowledge" (*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 791).

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 790 f.

[31] *Idealist View of Life*, pp. 175 and 200.

perception, we must affirm that our natural reason at its highest shares something of a higher, intuitive intellect.[28]

In other words, man's intellect is also intuitive and as "higher reason" is a guide not merely in empirical knowledge but to intuition itself. It is the unique check and verifier of all interpretations, even of spiritual experiences which would otherwise be just "ineffable" or even be subject to errors and illusions. Radhakrishnan, therefore, is right in defending against all positivists like A. Comte and pure rationalists like Ch. Wolff man's possession not merely of sensitive and discursive or hearsay knowledge but also of something of the intuitive type. And he does well to call it "integral," after Vivekananda, rather than "intuitive" knowledge,[29] as it includes, besides the cognitive, the emotive and conative also. When intuition is defined as integral insight, the suggestion is that the whole mind is at work in it.[30]

If we therefore take integral knowledge in its generic sense, we cannot but admit that many a genius at different places and times has claimed to have had some such experience even to a marked degree. Intense artistic or poetic experiences, for example, are not very uncommon.

Dr. Radhakrishnan indeed classifies his integral experiences into scientific, artistic, philosophical, and religious types. This I take to be in the ascending order since he calls the religious experience the highest, the one that includes all the others.[31] He does not, however, tell us explicitly the norm of that classification; it is perhaps taken to be obvious. Now, since, on the part of the experiencing subject, the whole is said to be at work in an integral experience, if this latter varies, not merely in degree, but also in kind, this variation must be due to the variation of the object experienced. One experience may and often will run into another; and yet one is by no means the other and is therefore explainable only by the determining object or reality. This is confirmed by the few examples our author gives, such as the highest art, charming rhapsody, sublime poetry, ecstatic love of God. If things, therefore, were not real in themselves or did not differ specifically but only superficially, as would be the case in formal monism, the qualitative difference between the artistic and the religious, for example, would hardly be explained.

Turning to the spiritual or religious experience itself, Dr. Radha-

krishnan, I think, rightly contends that any sincere lover of truth must admit not merely the possibility but even the occurrence of some extraordinary spiritual or religious phenomena all over the world, all along the centuries. How can we reject wholesale as pathological or illusory the testimony of thousands of intelligent, ascetical men, who claim to have had some unique experience at some time of their lives?[32] Truly, it seems to me, "the evidence is too massive to run away from."[33]

And according to Radhakrishnan, these spiritual or religious experiences are "mystical" ones. Now,can they really be called—are they truly—mystical in any exact sense of the word? Radhakrishnan indeed describes them as some sort of connatural, nonconceptual, fruitive experiences: "Tasting nothing, comprehending nothing in particular, holding itself in emptiness, the soul finds itself as having all. A lightning flash . . . a rapture beyond joy, a knowledge beyond reason . . ."[34] And there seems to be some sort of absolute, too, the extranormal consciousness of which renders the experience singular and mysterious: " It is not a consciousness of this or that thing";[35] "it is just turning inside and seeing the self."[36]

So if mystic experience be defined, as it should be, as a "fruitive experience of an absolute"[37]—prescinding, therefore, from the intimate nature of the absolute experienced—then with J. Maritain, O. Lacombe, and L. Gardet, Dr. Radhakrishnan is justified in calling the above experiences mystical if and when they are genuine.

With regard to the nature of the thing experienced, however, our author seems to be led away unaware by the strong currents of old tradition. Because it is perceived by a method of intellectual nescience that bypasses all interrelations of things, the particular absolute is seized as if it were *the* absolute. Not attending to this special coloring of the perception because of the specific mode that is adopted, Radha-

[32]Cf. J. Maritain, *Quatre essais sur l'esprit dans sa condition charnelle*, pp. 155 f.

[33]*Idealist View of Life*, p. 91.

[34]*Eastern Religions and Western Thought* (1939), p. 50.

[35]*Indian Philosophy*, II, 512.

[36]*Katha Upanishad*, II, 1, 1, quoted in Radhakrishnan's *The Principal Upanishads* (1953), p. 95.

[37]Cf. *Revue thomiste*, LIV, 298.

[38]Cf. L. Gardet's article, "Recherches sur la mystique naturelle," *Revue thomiste*, XLVIII, 94.

[39]*Indian Philosophy*, I, 177.

[40]*Idealist View of Life*, p. 94.

[41]Cf. L. Gardet's article, "Vraie et fausse mystique," *Revue thomiste*, LIV, 308.

[42]*Principal Upanishads*, p. 104.

[43]This is a happy, significant expression of M. Eliade's (*Techniques du yoga*, p. 97 and *passim*).

krishnan, like most Hindus, arrives at the easy but unwarranted solution that the reality experienced is no other than the Supreme Spirit, the Unique Absolute Itself.

It is unwarranted, I say, because it is an illegitimate transition and interpretation of the seer from the negative, psychological unawareness of limitation to positive, ontological exclusion of limitation in the absolute experienced. The grandeur of the Indian experience is its own limit, snare, and fall. The seer, owing to his special technique of reaching his experience, is not and cannot then be aware of the limitation of the absolute he is enjoying, of this metaphysical wonder of his soul's substantial *esse;* and so, after the experience, he thinks he has attained ontologically the Absolute Itself.[38] "He does not know what it is when he reaches it";[39] but when "the vision is no more, he strives to recapture and retain in memory . . . the process of reflection starts."[40] My *atman*, spirit or self, he argues, the thing I experienced, is absolute, just like *Brahman*, the Supreme; it is Brahman. I am Brahman, therefore: *aham brahmasmi*. This sort of musing, however, is no longer experience but interpretation, and so is subject to the verdict of logic. And sound logic forbids us to pass from mere distant similarity and analogical *amsatva*, participation, to simple identity and univocal unity.

It is unwarranted, again, because scientific induction forbids us to postulate more than what is strictly necessary to explain the various elements of the experience. All the elements of that fruitive, mystical experience can be explained adequately and scientifically by a natural, finite absolute; namely, the substantial act of existing of one's own spiritual soul, which, notwithstanding its limitation, is a true absolute, being an image and likeness of the Supreme Absolute.[41] It is the awakening, the realization of the self, *svanubhava;* "it is the possession of the soul or it is the soul that penetrates into its own ground and depth and becomes essential being."[42]

The soul, it is true, bound up as it is now with the body, normally never sees itself directly: it knows itself always in and through its acts. But why is it not possible for the spiritual soul, by a drastic process of purification and concentration, by a method of nescience, to transform in an extranormal act of pure entasis[43] the ordinary existential knowledge it has of itself into an extraordinary, secret,

strange, and wondrous experience? "The human individual in the contemplative sight, strips himself one after the other, of the outer sheaths of consciousness . . . untill all else fades away into illimitable darkness, until he is alone in the white radiance of a central and unique ecstasy." [44]

I am not denying, however, that these spiritual experiences may serve as special means to lead us to the very throne of God. I maintain that it would be unwarranted—nay more, contrary to sound reason itself—if man by his own force and endeavor attained God as He is in Himself. Some holy men, I believe, even among my Hindu compatriots, have really come to enjoy a sublime union with the Divinity itself, to share its light and love, to relish that loving contemplation. But that is only because "the Transcendent Self [not merely 'as it were,' but in very truth] stoops down and touches their [spiritual] eyes." [45] The *jiva*, self, can perhaps be experienced by self through a special initiation and technique; but the Divine Self, *Atman*, can never be experientially and affectively realized unless that Self "chooses" [46] and calls us unto Him by His loving grace, as the millions of Hindu *bhaktas* themselves affirm.

Of course all this distinction between the self and the Self, the spirit and the Spirit, would be meaningless if ever, even for a minute, we experienced or were able to experience mystically our essential identity with the Supreme. But *that* we are never aware of. "When we reach it, we do not know what it is; we seem to be in touch with reality other than matter, life or mind [*manas*] . . . the idea of God [as the reality experienced] is an interpretation." [47] But if we do not know what we were experiencing, how can we draw any definite conclusions from it? How can we interpret it as a union with *Brahman-Atman*, the Absolute itself, unless under a fallacy or a prejudice? "It is essential that we subject all these religious beliefs to a careful scrutiny of reason." [48] And reason and logic tell us for certain that, naturally speaking, any secret intuition of man, even at its highest, can only be of a creaturely absolute and never of the Supreme Absolute and that

[44] *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 63.
[45] *Indian Philosophy*, II, 512.
[46] *Ibid.*, I, 234, and *Principal Upanishads*, p. 102.
[47] *Idealist View of Life*, p. 86.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 219.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 307.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 310.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 310. Cf. also *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 46, and *Principal Upanishads*, p. 131.
[52] *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, pp. 85-111. This article is a very good inventory of Radhakrishnan's ideas.
[53] *Ibid.*, p. 110. (Italics mine.)

God alone can know God as He is and he to whom God graciously communicates Himself. Dr. Radhakrishnan may hold and try to defend absolute monism as a logical necessity; but he can never draw any conclusive proof for his monism from mysticism, not even of the Hindu type.

Finally, even the integral saving knowledge, as described by Radhakrishnan, does not seem to be wholly integral and saving. For subjectively the individuals continue to be born, to suffer, and to die; its is only their spirits, *ananda*, that are then said to be in communion with a greater Self; the intellectual, which is also characteristically human, seems to have no essential part in the experience itself. Our author's mystics or seers, therefore, "only touch the fringe, but do not enter the clouds; they only enter the light, but do not touch the flame." [49] Objectively also these freed souls are not fully saved unless and until the whole cosmos is saved; that is, dissolves into the Absolute. Man in fact will be completely integrated, perfected, saved only when he is no more.

But here let it be noted that Radhakrishnan sees the utter futility of this individual and cosmic evolution since it all disintegrates finally. "Is the spirit of man to be brought to fruition," he asks, "only to be broken for ever?" [50] But he *does not* and *cannot* give a reasonable and satisfactory answer to this point, which is so vital and crucial. He evades an answer by simply affirming that there may and will be others, other such futile cosmic manifestations or purposeless *lilas*, sports of the Supreme.[51] By thus refusing to give us the required answer, he unwittingly brings down, it seems to me, all the mysterious and somewhat fascinating house of cards he has been constructing so laboriously up to now. Professor G. P. Conger is right when he concludes his brief survey of "Radhakrishnan's World" [52] by saying that "Radhakrishnan's integral experience points *the way*, even if it misconstrues the *goal*. It needs to be purged of its inconsistencies and shorn of its extravagancies and to become genuinely integral." [53] And Dr. Radhakrishnan's integral experience will, in my opinion, be more consistent and genuinely integral only if man, as the *bhaktas* hold, not ceasing to be essentially man, is held to become actively "godlike" through the loving gift of his God.

At the very outset, the high aspirations and noble ideals that animate Dr. Radhakrishnan, as well as most of our Indian thinkers, must be acknowledged and given credit to. First, as absolute plurality is metaphysically repugnant, Radhakrishnan does well in rejecting philosophies such as the Samkhya that set up two or more absolute and ultimate realities. All true philosophy must in truth be "fundamentally a monism" in the sense that it acknowledges the fact that "the reals are [truly and wholly] dependent, *para-tantra* on God who alone is [absolutely] independent, *svatantra*!" [54]

Again, Radhakrishnan wants not to preach a dogmatic theology but to expound an integral philosophy, a philosophy, namely, which offers an interpretation of the universe and which is at once rational and depending on logical reflection and not acts of faith.[55] To philosophize thus is certainly a commendable thing.

Lastly, true to the Indian tradition which is "essentially and intensely spiritual." Dr. Radhakrishnan insists, against all species of materialists, that Spirit and Spirit alone can be the true and ultimate explanation of the whole universe.[56] Surely, all of us must agree that "the non-conscious cannot be the cause of the conscious. If anything, the consciousness must be the cause of the nonconsciousness." [57] Here one can also see and admire the longing of the human spirit to soar back to, and be at rest in, its ontological Source—a longing that has haunted our Indian ancestors right from the Vedic times. And this spirituality flowers forth in intense, interior, and personal religion, tending not merely to contemplate, but even to be united with God in personal love.[58] Dr. Radhakrishnan boldly exclaims: "The one fact of life in India is the Eternal Being of God." [59] Obviously this is an exaggeration; but it contains a grain of truth which we can treasure.

Nevertheless, as students of philosophy we are interested more in the concrete results achieved by thinkers than in their mere good

[54] *Indian Philosophy*, I, 40.
[55] *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 820.
[56] *Ibid.*, p. 31.
[57] *Indian Philosophy*, II, 481.
[58] *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 799.
[59] *Indian Philosophy*, I, 42.
[60] *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, p. 32.
[61] *Indian Philosophy*, I, 170 and 194.
[62] *Ibid.*, 195.
[63] *Principal Upanishads*, p. 66.
[64] *Ibid.*, p. 67.

intentions. And so we ask, Does Radhakrishnan really give us a synthetic, rational, spiritual vision of *all* facts and realities?

All vague or ambiguous expressions aside, Dr. Radhakrishnan himself gives us the fundamentals of his world-view: "Supreme being is one in all, including [and especially in] our real self. It is our business to discover and consciously become That."[60] *Brahman-Atman*, Absolute-God, is the sole reality and somehow includes the universe and all *jivas* too. Every subject and object are ultimately identical. This nondualism, Radhakrishnan contends, is not a vague hypothesis but a necessary implication of all relevant thinking, feeling, and willing.[61] However obscure that may be, we have no right, he says, to deny it, for any other position would be illogical.[62]

In this "personal" philosophy of his, however, Dr. Radhakrishnan hardly succeeds in synthesizing even the different systems of the Vedanta, not to speak of the different views of the world. As a matter of fact, there is no synthesis at all but only a vigorous re-presentation of the later *advaita* in a Western dress, in the terminology of Plato, Plotinus, Kant, Bradley, Bergson, and others. It is but the old drug served under a new label.

Do we at least find some unity? During the cosmic evolution, *sristi*, Radhakrishnan shows us his Supreme as being simultaneously Absolute and God, the World-Spirit and the Matter-World, spirit and matter, all contrary qualities and perfections. It is the one real subject (Self) that thinks and acts ultimately in all, that helps its own part in another, that blasphemes itself in one human frame, that commits adultery and murder in another; it is the all-inclusive whole that cages all "appearances" formally. Is this philosophical unity? The Supreme, however, Radhakrishnan protests, is not a sum of all these but is in itself an ineffable unity separable only in appearance.[63] Yet he adds, "If [only] we are able to hold them together"[64]—these really different standpoints of the same reality! The real difficulty is just that. We surely admit that the Divine must be and is in itself ineffable. Just as an artist is not formally the work of art he creates or the pianist the harmony he strikes forth—though the artist is his artistic creation eminently and the musician his melody—so also the Divine must be eminently perfect, having in one perfect act all perfections; and yet the Divine cannot be essentially or formally identified with

limited, sinful subjects. This would be no longer divine ineffable unity but a congeries of implicit contradictions and hence no unity at all.

During the cosmic involution, *pralaya*, however, we seem to get a suprarational but unproved unity. For when the cosmos, God, and souls lapse into the Absolute, just as they once came out of it, there will be then some sort of unity or even unicity. This, though, will be a unity which *we* shall never be aware of, a oneness which the Absolute itself "knows or else it knows it not."[65] No; it is not the ordered unity of all facts and realities we sought for. It is not by despising or suppressing real plurality of limited perfections but with, and in, that plurality that we must get our fundamental unity. And the only valid and intelligible unity in diversity is to be found not in the direction of *advaita* which Radhakrishnan takes but in the opposite direction of "fundamental monism" which he discards.

What of the rational account and consistent explanation of all reality he promised? Although we see and experience with undeniable certainty our own individual nature as limited by, and distinct from, other selves and nonselves, yet the ultimate explanation of all these, according to him, is not individual but cosmic delusion, which lasts for some indefinite time and then vanishes like a soapbubble in a basin of water. The how and why of it all is *anirvacaniya*, inexplicable; it it a *lila*, sport of Brahman; it is all *maya*, mystery. Not only Brahman, therefore, but even the cosmos we started with is ultimately a complete mystery. Indeed, as an *advaitin*, one can dodge all arguments and answers by saying that all is *maya;* but by that very procedure one renounces one's claim to give a rational, philosophical explanation of the whole universe with its source, the real and living God.

Often indeed, "without conforming to the strict philosophical position" of *maya* or mystery,[66] Dr. Radhakrishnan tries to give some explanation of the universe and even of the ineffable Brahman. But, even according to him, they are neither ultimate nor satisfactory; they are tentative and perhaps not quite self-consistent.[67] They are a fall, a precipitate from the real,[68] not the real itself; they are only the

[65] *Rig Veda*, X, 129, 7.
[66] *Indian Philosophy*, I, 184.
[67] *Idealist View of Life*, p. 306.
[68] *Indian Philosophy*, I, 166-69.
[69] *Principal Upanishads*, p. 84.
[70] *Brh. Upanishad*, II, 1, 20. These comparisons, however, should not be pressed too far, at least in the Upanishadic writings.
[71] *Indian Philosophy*, II, 532.

distorted truth seen in the mirror of our mind that has been broken up into a hundred pieces by the "irreal" logic of mankind. The truth is just this: "The Real is One without a second, *Brahman-Atman;* and That thou art, *tattvamasi.*" It is true that Radhakrishnan defends the reality of the world, like Samkara, against the Vijnanavadins; but in doing so, he is just defending the reality of Brahman that underlies them all. Of course the world "is unreal *of* or *by* itself";[69] but is it real *in* itself? And we are given the old answer: There is the Real and nothing beside It.

Certainly, like Samkara, Dr. Radhakrishnan must be praised for trying to maintain the perfect unity and immutability of the Supreme even while it is somehow the source and goal of all being. But in his attempt at some explanation, taking creation somewhat mechanically and anthropomorphically, he naturally rejects it and so prefers the spontaneous transformation of the Supreme. "As a spider moves along the thread, as small sparks come forth from the fire, even so from this Self come forth all breaths, all worlds, all divinities, all beings."[70] Radhakrishnan is indeed able to hold that the Absolute *transforms itself* into *real* through "derived" multiplicity *without* undergoing any *real transformation whatever*—an implicit contradiction in terms unless the transformation or the multiplicity be purely illusory. And yet Radhakrishnan does not see that his and Samkara's strictly philosophical position is better explained by the correct notion of creation according to which actual finite beings which are completely dependent on the Almighty but are not themselves essentially identical with Him are brought into existence, without any change in Himself. He has no *real,* dependent relation to creatures; but these latter are essentially related to Him; these are *from* Him but are *not Himself.* We do indeed admit that there is somewhat of a mystery about the act of creation, since it is an eternally free act of the all-powerful God that is identical with Himself. Reality may be mysterious, but "it should at least be self-consistent."[71]

In his philosophical treatment as a whole, Dr. Radhakrishnan would have done better service if he had paid more attention to clarity, precision, and the consistency of his ideas and expressions. Though he is careful to translate all the Sanskrit words he uses, yet the English equivalents are apt to lead astray all but the careful students of *advaita.*

Many a fundamental philosophico-religious term like "being," "real," "God," "person," "mysticism," and so forth, do not have exactly the connotations that they have in the Aristotelian or in the Thomistic system of thought. No wonder, therefore, that the brief conspectus which we presented in Part I of this article seemed harmless and consistent, for we were reading into terms a meaning other than the author's. But in an absolutely nondualistic philosophy, they are not quite consistent. Expressions like, "When the creator and the created coincide, God lapses into the Absolute" [72] and "Until the cosmos is saved, God is partly *in potentia*, partly in act" [73] may be harmless in Radhakrishnan's view; but they will never be accepted by the common man or by world philosophy.

Dr. Radhakrishnan is quite adept in argumentation. He can attack and even be pungent at times, but unfortunately his logic does not seem to be always faultless. Occasionally and, it seems, unconsciously he glides into what are called fallacies of accident. Without direct evidence or logical guarantee, how can he pass, as he does at times, from the possible to the actual, from the similar to the identical, from the subjective to the objective, from a heterogeneous part to a homogeneous whole? For example, "Though the present order of things must pass away, there will be other world orders in an endless series: for God is infinite possibility"; [74] the Absolute has infinite possibilities of manifestation and therefore it *will* go on indefinitely "expressing" itself. Again, "God is life and is in us." [75] If God were not in us, there would be no sense of need in us for the infinite,[76] for all that is great and divine.[77] We are not ourselves alone; so we are God-men.[78] Not that Dr. Radhakrishnan does not know that presence is not identity: "The indwelling of God in the universe," he says, "does not mean the identity of God with the universe"; [79] and yet in the above argument he seems to forget it.

We have indeed great admiration for our classical teachers like Samkara and Ramanuja; for, on a religious, theologico-philosophical basis they at least tried to construct a logical, coherent system, ready to sacrifice anything that marred the unity of the system. But we can-

[72] "Spirit in Man," p. 500.
[73] *Ibid.*, p. 501.
[74] *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 46.
[75] *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, p. 22.
[76] *Heart of Hindustan*, pp. 51 and 55.
[77] "Spirit in Man," p. 484.
[78] *Idealist View of Life*, p. 158.
[79] *Hindu View of Life*, p. 70.
[80] *Indian Philosophy*, II, 638.
[81] *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 828.
[82] *Indian Philosophy*, I, 195.

not say as much for Radhakrishnan. Indeed, this sort of classical love of logical precision does not even seem to please Dr. Radhakrishnan, who calls it "excessive attachment." [80] Naturally, the conclusions of the classical teachers cut away the ground on which he stands; but, instead of disliking their logical precision, he would have done better if he had scrutinized and corrected the premises and postulates from which such conclusions flow.

Obviously, in this background of absolute nondualism, *advaita*, true spirituality, and religion turn out to be not self-forgetting charity but perforce a disguised form of self-seeking. It is not ultimately humble and loving consecration of self to an all-knowing, all-loving God but seeking, communing with, and worshipping the "self," which is somehow a fragment of a characterless, impersonal Thing. The ego-sense which is denounced so violently and so often in the empirical world finds its *ersatz* in the transcendental plane itself. "Religious people the world over aim at a knowledge of God" [81] and not of their own smaller or bigger self. True religion demands two at least, God and soul, who are distinct and yet bound together by knowledge and love. Many an *advaitin* indeed is often religious; but he is so in spite of his *advaita* theory, only because his heart is stronger than his head and most naturally yearns for his Maker and God.

My last reflection on Radhakrishnan's philosophical view touches a point that radically blurs the beauty even of his true and good ideas; namely, his doctrine of the relativity of truth. We are all perfectly aware of the limited and imperfect nature of our knowledge of realities, each one of which is a "mystery" in itself; but we do know at least something that is objectively in reality, and from this conscious conformity of our intellect to the reality we judge the truth of our knowledge. We are also convinced that there is something of an absolute nature in our judgments, something which is eternally true—at least the fact that we made these judgments. Even for Radhakrishnan, the "truths of his eternal religion, *sanatana dharma*" are absolutely true: "*Atman* is the sole reality and includes the universe too . . . Any other position would be illogical." [82] Radhakrishnan's works are filled with such categorical statements about reality and conduct; and yet he casts them all overboard by saying that all truth is relative. The convictions of our ancestors "stirred their hearts and quickened their

breath,"[83] devoted as they were to eternal truths. They did not, and neither should we, deny that there could be different views, more or less perfect, on a subject matter—and this because of our limited, imperfect, composite nature. But they did, and we with them should, deny that two absolutely contradictory propositions about the same reality from the same point of view or formality could be true at the same time. Great men like Samkara would not tolerate even a particle of falsehood to stain what they believed to be pure truth; their vigorous commentaries, for example, are a continuous protest against the relativist tendency of modern times. Truth is neither mine nor thine; it is universal; it is for all; and ultimately God is subsistent Truth. All philosophies and all religions should be challenged to produce their credentials and asked to defend their doctrines in a logical and convincing way.

I am indeed sorry to be unable to bring out here in detail the real merits of Dr. Radkakrishnan, who succeeds to a large extent in purifying some of the fundamental, traditional notions of Hindu ethics, such as *karma*, *samsara*, and human freedom. These he corrects and elevates. *Karma* is for him not an impersonal ultimate or absolute; it is the expression of God's will and purpose. Rebirth of man as an animal or plant is to be taken not literally but figuratively. We are really free: "We are not puppets moved hither and thither by blind impersonal necessity of omnipotent matter or the sovereignty of divine providence."[84] These, however, are but instances that show how modern Hindus react to the impact of Western philosophy and Christian education. Many of them prefer to patch up the old views rather than rebuild on a solid ontological basis.

Dr. Radhakrishnan has great talents as a successful writer, a master orator, a passionate social reformer. He starts philosophizing with high aspirations and healthy optimism; but he fails to give a really synthetic, consistent, philosophical, and spiritual view of the world

[83] *Ibid.*, 27.
[84] *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 42.
[85] *Indian Philosophy*, I, 51.
[86] *Ibid.*, 55.
[87] *Ibid.*, 53.
[88] To prove the fact of integral experience by authority, Radhakrishnan quotes: "The ultimate truth which is the criterion by which we measure all other relative truths is only to be experienced, not to be demonstrated" and gives the reference as *Summa Theol.*, q. 46, a. 2 ("Spirit in Man," p. 485). I do not, however, find the second part of the clause about the experience there. Moreover, faith in St. Thomas has not the same meaning that it has in Radhakrishnan.
[89] *Indian Philosophy*, I, 31 f.

and of its God, which we rightly expected from a man of his stature and standing.

What perhaps has prevented Radhakrishnan from making great strides towards a harmonious philosophy? It is the fact, I should say, that he does not shake off fully "the burdensome wealth of tradition that clogs."[85] The "sense of perfection that is ancient"[86] and Hindu seems to oppress him as though in spite of himself. His vision, his philosophical view of the world, is essentially limited to the *advaita*, though it is embellished accidentally with ideas and expressions taken from diverse systems of the world. What makes his view less coherent and therefore less acceptable is the fact that he wants to defend *philosophically* (that is, by pure reason) what most of our Hindu ancestors defended *theologically* (that is, on the authority of the supposed revealed word of God). The "faith of his fathers,"[87] he believes, has almost everything to give to others but has nothing, at least nothing substantial, to receive from them. This exaggerated respect, therefore, for the Hindu tradition in general and for the *advaita* shorn of its theology in particular seems to account at least in part for the deficiencies of Radhakrishnan's ideas.

Besides, his study of philosophy and of religion seems to neglect almost entirely a serious consideration of the fact of religion whether among the primitives or among the civilized, the fact that demands a real personal supreme Being as the author and aim of all creation. Hardly, if ever, does he seem to have studied with an open mind other philosophies such as that of St. Thomas, whom he quotes once or twice but not quite accurately.[88] Even if "monistic idealism" (as our author understands it) is the highest truth revealed to India[89]—which millions of Hindus even would not accept—it does not follow that it is the truest and the highest form of philosophy or religion revealed to the entire world and for all times. At any rate, a philosopher, to be true to his name, must seek truth with the widest possible vision extending to the whole world and finally to the ultimate Truth, God Himself.

Chronicle

Marquette University has announced a four-day philosophical institute in the teaching of philosophy, June 15 to 18. The topics and discussion leaders are the following: first day—demonstration, the Reverend William Baumgaertner; second day—demonstration in the philosophy of nature, Dr. Francis J. Collingwood; third day—demonstration in metaphysics, Dr. James F. Anderson; fourth day—demonstration in moral philosophy, the Reverend William E. Dooley, S.J. Further details can be obtained from Mr. James T. Murphy (Department of Philosophy, Marquette University, Milwaukee 3).

Loyola University (Chicago) held a series of evening roundtable conferences on business ethics on February 17, February 24, March 3, and March 10. The conferences were directed by the Reverend Theodore V. Purcell, S.J. Guest lecturers included the Reverend Bernard Dempsey, S.J. (Marquette University), the Reverend Henry Wirtenberger, S.J. (Xavier University), the Reverend James T. Mangan, S.J. (St. Mary's of the Lake, Mundelein), and the Reverend John R. Connery, S.J. (West Baden College).

The Reverend Maurice R. Holloway, S.J., will become the Editor of The Modern Schoolman starting with the November, 1959, issue. The Reverend George P. Klubertanz, S.J., will remain on the staff as an associate editor.

ARISTOTLE AND THE IDENTITY OF INDISCERNIBLES

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In an earlier article comparing the views of Leibniz and Plato in terms of the problem of the identity of indiscernibles,[1] I proposed that this problem can be considered as providing a useful instrument for measuring the distance between philosophical positions. The issues raised by the famous Leibnizian doctrine are of central metaphysical importance, involving the ancient mystery of the One and the Many. More precisely, they concern the principle of *differentiation* of being which functions in a given metaphysical system. From this point of view, I tried to show, in the Venice Congress paper, that Leibniz and Plato are polar opposites. The identity-of-indiscernibles principle leads Leibniz to make all differentiation formal or essential. Universally applied, on every level of being, the Leibnizian principle results in the elimination of all real contingency and of all material, as opposed to formal, difference. In Plato, on the contrary, the exigencies of the *chorismos* or separation between sensibles and their essential principles, the Forms, and the further *chorismos* between the Forms and their single essential principle, the One, make all differences fall outside of essence into the domain of *relation*, of existing nonbeing. Where the essence of beings is simple unity, they cannot be a differentiated manifold in virtue of their essence but only by the power of a principle other than essence and contrary to it, which receives by way of imaging.[2] The Platonic "material" principle of otherness and differentiation is indeterminate quantitative relationship.

If the identity-of-indiscernibles problem is to provide an instrument

by which the intervals separating different metaphysical systems can be measured, one must first fix the extremes between which other positions will lie. Thus, in the "Two Cratyluses" paper, I tried to exhibit the Platonic and Leibnizian positions as defining these limits of doctrinal variation. The location of a particular system on that scale will be dependent upon the extent to which existents within the system are identified with, or distinguished from, their own essences. This will determine how operative the Leibnizian principle of identity of indiscernibles is in a given system, and for what levels of being.

If there are to be many individuals possessing the same essential nature but distinct in number, their essence cannot itself account for their numerical distinction. Such an accidental multitude will only be possible if there is some lack of identity between the individual subjects and their own essence. But is there more than one way in which this lack of identity can be conceived? We have already seen the classic Platonic doctrine of separation, in which an accidental multitude is possible only by the defective imaging of the essential perfection in a receptacle which is itself defined by privation of form. Such a receiving subject has no potentiality for becoming the essential

[1]"The Two Cratyluses: The Problem of Identity of Indiscernibles," *Atti del XII Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia*, Venezia, 12-18 Settembre, 1958 (Firenze, Sansoni).

[2]This implies that Platonic beings involve a kind of composition of really distinct principles of being. But it must not be confused with the composition of act and potency involved in Thomism and least of all with the famous Thomistic "real distinction" of *esse* and essence. The Thomistic doctrine of the limitation of act by potency is not of Platonic origin, in spite of recent attempts to so derive it. The supreme principle of act in the Platonic metaphysical order is not *esse* but is rather a principle in the order of essence, understood precisely as the simple unity which is the principle of number in the genus of quantity. As such, it is not even the transcendental, analogical unity which in St. Thomas is convertible with being. Such a univocal and essential principle of act is incapable of being received proportionately and intrinsically in many different subjects, so as to confer upon them a *proper* unity, in a sense comparable to that in which every being in Thomism has an act of existing which is proper to it. There is no potency for simplicity. Consequently, the limitation of act in Platonism is effected not by potency but by that which is the privative contrary of the One. In Plato, as in Spinoza, all determination—all differentiation—is by negation. This is to receive by way of defective imitation.

[3]Cf. Aristotle: "This thinker [Plato] means by the notbeing which together with Being makes existing things a plurality, falsity and everything of this nature . . ." (*Metaphysics* N. ii. 1. 9 [1089a20-24]).

[4]*Ibid.*, Z. vi. 1031a15.

[5]*Ibid.*, 1031a28-b18.

[6]*Ibid.*, xv, 1040a-b4; also, x-xi, 1036a2-6.

[7]*Ibid.*, xiii, 1038b10-17.

[8]*Ibid.*, vi, 1031b19-23.

[9]*Ibid.*, 1031a28-30.

[10]*Ibid.*, Λ. viii. 1074a32-38.

[11]*Ibid.*, Z. vi. 1032a5-6.

[12]*Ibid.*, xi. 1037b2-5.

[13]*Ibid.*, 1037b5-7.

perfection really and intrinsically. It can only mirror or reflect it in terms of a shadowy, unreal, plane of existence.[3] Short of this complete separation, which defines one of our doctrinal limits, is there any intermediate ground which can be occupied, which will not collapse into the other Leibnizian extreme?

Aristotle is a significant test case. In the *Metaphysics*[4] he asks the question whether each thing and its essence are the same or different. The immediate context in which this question is raised involves criticism of the Platonic theory, in which not only sensibles are separated from their own essences, the Forms, but the Forms themselves have an extrinsic essential principle. The Platonic theory of *chorismos* is rejected by Aristotle on a double ground[5] as undermining both the knowledge of reality and the reality of things. The individual whose essence is separated from it is unreal, and the separated essence is unknowable. As separated from matter and subsistent in its own right, the Form becomes a unique and indefinable individual.[6] Not only is it indefinable, but it is impossible for it to be predicable of many.[7] In the light of these criticisms of *chorismos*, Aristotle tells us "that each individual thing is one and the same with its essence, and not merely accidentally so."[8] The reason given is that to have knowledge of the individual is to have knowledge of its essence.

Such an assertion seems to place Aristotle at the Leibnizian extreme of our scale, but we must not be too hasty in drawing such a conclusion. The context of the passage in question indicates that Aristotle's primary reference is to substances such as the Platonists conceived the Forms to be, having no other substances prior to them[9] and existing in separation from their sensible images. For Aristotle such immaterial, separated substances, whether regarded as Forms or unmoved movers, will be identical with their own essences; and no accidental multitude—no plurality within a species—will be possible for them.[10] The essence and the individual are in these cases strictly the same; this is true in every case of that which is not dependent upon something else but is self-subsistent and primary.[11] By "primary," Aristotle tells us he means "that which does not imply the presence of something in something else as a material substrate."[12] Things "which are of the nature of matter, or of wholes that include matter" are said not to be the same as their essences.[13]

What, then, are we to conclude about sensible substances? It seems clear that they are not identical with their essences. There is no difference between "Socrates" and "to be Socrates," [14] since in either case the individual whole including individual sensible matter is designated. Nor is there a difference between "soul" and "to be soul," since both expressions designate form or actuality. But "to be man" and "man" are not the same.[15]

There is, nevertheless, a distinction between the way in which the concrete whole individual substance, Socrates, differs from his essence and the kind of difference found in an accidental unity—for example, "Socrates" and "cultured." [16] Both the accidental term and that of which it is an accident are "cultured," so that in one sense (considered from the point of view of the accidental form itself) there is identity, and in another sense difference, since the essence of the accidental term is not the same as "the man" or "the cultured man." [17] Although Socrates is not identical with his essence, humanity, it is still *his* essence, in a way in which "cultured" or "white" is not. The essence or *to ti en einai* which is the object of definition is in the individual as his intelligible or definable being, the mode of being signified by the category of substance.

This will involve, for Aristotle, a fundamental departure from the Platonic view of essence as incomposite. It is not possible for essence conceived as radically simple—as pure form alone—to be intrinsically and properly possessed by many numerically distinct individuals. It is precisely because the Platonic essential principle is simple, indivisible unity that the *chorismos* is necessitated. Such an essential principle is radically incommunicable to many save by way of negation and extrinsic reference. Consequently, the essences of sensible substances are, for Aristotle, composites of matter and form. Plato had introduced a "material" principle of differentiation—the relative nonbeing of the *Sophistes*—into the heart of being itself. But he had been careful to exclude matter in this sense from the *essence* of being. Where the principle which differentiates and multiplies is *privation*, it cannot be

[14] *Ibid.*, vi. 1032a7-10.
[15] *Ibid.*, H. iii. 1043b2-5.
[16] *Ibid.*, Z. xi. 1037b5-8.
[17] *Ibid.*, vi. 1031b23-28.
[18] *Ibid.*, H. iii. 1043b28-33.
[19] "Aristotle's Theory of Predication" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Philosophy, Saint Louis University) chap. 5.
[20] As Blackwell points out (*ibid.*), this seems to be the basis of Father Joseph Owens's theory of the meaning of *tode ti* in *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian 'Metaphysics'* (Toronto, 1951).
[21] *Metaphys.*, Z. viii. 1033b7.

introduced into the order of essential perfection and metaphysical act without contradiction. If the Platonic *chorismos* is to be overcome, so that sensible things can have an essential core of intelligible and necessary being in their own right in spite of their contingency and change, the ratio of matter to form must be *potency* rather than privation. Matter must be potential *ousia* and *tode ti*. So conceived, it can enter the order of essence itself, and the sensible flux can acquire a proper substantiality and scientific intelligibility.

Indeed, it is only essence in this composite sense which is definable, since in order to be definable, essence must be composed of parts related as differentia to genus, as act to potency. If the essential parts were themselves definable, they would in turn have to be composed of further parts to infinity. Consequently, the essence which is the object of definition cannot be either the matter or the form of the composite. Hence Aristotle writes:

> Therefore one kind of substance can be defined and formulated—that is, the composite kind—whether it be perceptible or intelligible; but the primary parts of which this consists cannot be defined, since a definatory formula predicates something of something, and one part of the definition must play the part of matter and the other that of form.[18]

Essence in the case of sensible substances cannot, therefore, be identified with form alone. The form as such is both incomposite and a "this," and both characteristics render it indefinable. As Dr. R. J. Blackwell remarks,[19] any attempt to identify substance as essence with substance as form in the area of sensible things leads to insuperable difficulties. Among them is the Platonic dilemma in which the form would have to be both singular and nonsingular at the same time.[20]

But although Aristotle opposes to the Platonic separation of essence a doctrine of immanence which demands a composition of act and potency within the order of essence itself, he still refuses to identify the concrete individual composite of matter and form with its essence. There are significant differences. Individual composites are generated, whereas essence is ungenerated.[21] The concrete composite is a "this,"

but it is impossible to define the singular as such.[22] The definable essence cannot include *individual* perceptible matter—this flesh and these bones as found in Socrates—but only *common* perceptible matter.[23] Individual matter and individuating accidents constitute an addition to the essential principles, an addition or determination which is not in the line of essence or caused by it. There is, therefore, in Aristotle's view of the physical cosmos (at least here on earth), a factor of purely material differentiation and accidental multitude which is irreducible to essential intelligibility. And since no agent intends material multiplicity as such, since the *indefinite* is incompatible with the character of an end, material multiplicity within the species of physical substances falls into the shadowy area of chance and luck and of the *accidental being* which is the subject matter of no science whatsoever.[24] There are no causes and principles of accidental being of the same kind as there are of the essential—if there were, Aristotle tells us, all would be necessary; and the possibility of a thing's either occurring or not occurring would be entirely removed from the range of events.[25] Of accidental being, and hence of accidental multitude, the causes are unordered and indefinite.[26]

Let us now summarize the results of our experiment in placing Aristotle on our scale. The transformation formulae by which Aristotle overcomes, on the level of sensible existents, the complete Platonic separation of a thing from its essence have been described. They consist in the introduction of a composition of form and matter into essence, and the substitution of potentiality for privation as the material principle. So transformed, matter in Aristotle can, within limits, function as an *essential* principle of being. It acquires a certain intelligibility in relation to form, even though, in itself, in its radical indetermination, it is unintelligible. It is, indeed, the source of contingency, of the possibility of being and not being, which flaws the substances of this planet. It is a potentiality which alternates between the transient acquisition of formal perfection and privation. It is the root source of chance and luck, and even, on occasion, of the kind of failure of formal embodiment which is called a monster. Science, for Aristotle, deals with the necessary, with things which cannot be other

[22] *Ibid.*, x 1036a2-6.
[23] *Ibid.*, 1035a17-22.
[24] *Ibid.*, K. viii. 1064b15-1065a6.
[25] *Ibid.*, 1065a6-20.
[26] *Ibid.*, 1065a21-35.
[27] *Posterior Analytics* I. vi. 74b5-6.
[28] *De Partibus Animalium* I. i. 639b20—640a12.
[29] *Metaphys.*, K. viii. 1064b24-29.

than they are.[27] Nevertheless, physical substances admit of scientific knowledge, by virtue of *hypothetical* necessity,[28] though they lack the absolute necessity and intelligibility which only the separated substances, completely identical with their own essences, can possess. It is hypothetically necessary that matter be disposed and ordered in certain ways in order that there might be forms of such and such kinds. In the very *essences* of such entities this disposition of matter in relation to form is included.

But there is still much that escapes this ordering of matter to form. And included in this irrational surd factor of purely accidental being is the material multiplicity of individuals within species of physical substances. There can be for Aristotle no per-se causality of material distinction. In principle, moreover, even a *divine*, providential knowledge and ordering of such material individuals is excluded. Only the Sophist, Aristotle tells us, pretends to knowledge of accidental being; and "Plato is not far wrong when he says that the Sophist spends his time on nonbeing."[29]

Even in Aristotle, then, as in Plato, nonbeing in a sense has entered into the realm of existence as a cause of material differentiation irreducible to any essential principle. The existence of real contingency involves the existence of real irrationality. Where form and essence constitute the supreme source of intelligibility, an honest recognition of contingent facts implies that there is in the world a stubborn residue of unreason, opaque to mind, an aboriginal source of disorder which is only partly open to rational "persuasion" and ordering. Even when this dark principle is converted from privation to potentiality in the order of essence (like the Furies, who were enshrined on the side of the Athenian Acropolis, where they were honored as benevolent deities), the transformation is only partially successful.

There is, therefore, for Aristotle a residual irrationality in the physical cosmos which exhibits itself in the sheer material or numerical distinction of individuals of the same species. These individuals, while not as shadowy and evanescent as the images moving across the face of Plato's Receptacle, still must be said to stand near the frontier between being and nonbeing. On the other hand, in the divine substances, the unmoved movers, which exist apart from matter and motion, there is the fullness of being and actuality. Each is identical

with his essence; and no possibility exists of a plurality within a species, since no matter is present in them.[30] The very essence of such a separated substance is actuality. It is on this level that the Leibnizian identity principle is verified. Here only formal distinction is operative. Can we say, however, that such purely formal distinction on this level has achieved complete metaphysical intelligibility? There remain serious questions.

Aristotle's assertion of a plurality of immaterial substances is founded in what he regards as physical or astronomical exigencies. But is a multitude of utterly simple forms, in a system where *form* is the highest principle of metaphysical act, metaphysically possible? It is not, one should note, a problem of *numerical* distinction at all—the forms differ precisely as forms. The criticism sometimes made of Aristotle that he postulates a *number* of immaterial entities in contradiction of his doctrine that *matter* alone brings about numerical distinction[31] misses the point. There is here no question of sheer numerical distinction within a species, but solely of formal difference. The real metaphysical difficulty is one to which Plato seems to have been more sensitive than Aristotle. Is it really possible to have a plurality of absolutely simple entities, each identical with its essence and enjoying the fullness of unlimited actuality? The problem is the same whether the entities in question are the Forms of Plato's earlier theory or the simple unmoved movers of Book Lambda.

Perhaps they might be regarded as simply diverse, rather than different, since difference implies some kind of generic or at least analogical community of being in respect of which difference can be asserted.[32] This, however, would seem to postulate at the metaphysical summit a sheer diversity of disconnected and essentially unordered principles of being. It would be difficult to see what meaning the common predication of "being" of them all could possess. If simply diverse forms in the plural constitute the ultimate norm and fount of metaphysical intelligibility, how can being qua being possess the unity of object necessary for a science of it to be possible? Even in the pattern of *pros hen* equivocals, the reference of the term "being" would no longer be to *one*.

[30] *Ibid.*, Λ. vii. 1072b18-22. Cf. also *ibid.*, viii. 1074a32-38.

[31] Hugh Tredennick, for example, makes this criticism in his Loeb Library edition of the *Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1947), II, 160. The plurality of unmoved movers has occasioned difficulty since the time of Theophrastus.

[32] *Metaphys.*, I. iii. 1054b24-32.

If the simple separated substances differ in some generic respect in which they are alike, then composition would be implied—indeed, matter-form composition in their very essence. If there is no common genus, then presumably they differ in their *being*, regarded as a perfection analogically common to all. But this seems to imply, if there are many such beings, that that which differentiates and restricts them in their being is indeed their form, but form now considered as a potency to an act higher than form itself. Some composition in such entities of act and potency in an order other than essence seems demanded.

Aristotle seems never to have faced these questions on a properly metaphysical terrain, nor does he possess the principles which would make possible a solution on this level. The Platonic option, which did indeed postulate a principle of act higher than forms—the One—was not open to him, since the consequences would include a reversion to *chorismos*. This would place the ultimate *act* of being beyond being itself and, in doing so, would diminish and weaken the very reality of being so that it becomes an image of its own essence. Is another metaphysical option possible—a new set of transformation formulae—which will not entail such consequences? I will leave this problem for a future article on St. Thomas Aquinas and the identity of indiscernibles.

We saw also that the metaphysical primacy of form in Aristotle necessitated as a consequence that the existence of real contingency in the world should be also the existence of a real irrationality. In particular, the material distinction of physical substances becomes the result of chance. There is no possibility of a providential knowledge and ordering of individuals on this level. In the next exercise in doctrinal measurement on our scale, St. Thomas, we will encounter a position which holds real contingency and denies the existence of real irrationality.

WALTER E. STOKES, S.J., *Saint Louis University*

Whitehead's Metaphysics. **By Ivor Leclerc. New York: Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. xiii + 234. $3.75.**

This study is based on the conviction that there is a need for an introduction to *Process and Reality* precisely because Whitehead in that work faces a new set of problems on a specifically metaphysical level. This need is acute, since Whitehead presents his metaphysical notions in the early part of that work without giving much indication as to how he has arrived at them. For *Process and Reality* begins with a highly condensed summary of Whitehead's metaphysics that cannot be understood until the remainder of the book is mastered; furthermore, the detailed explanation of each notion in turn presupposes an understanding of all the other notions given in the summary.

Because Leclerc rejects the position that Whitehead's metaphysics is merely the development of earlier theories of the philosophy of science into a more comprehensive scheme, he is convinced that those who find the needed introduction in *Science and the Modern World* and the two lectures, *Nature and Life*, are mistaken. Rather, Leclerc believes that in these places Whitehead is interpreting the data of mathematical physics in the light of philosophical concepts that have been arrived at by a specifically philosophical procedure. The view that a specifically philosophical procedure is at work in the later writings is the key to understanding Leclerc's opposition to interpreting Whitehead's metaphysics as a philosophy of twentieth-century physics which attempts to provide the fundamental theory for physics of relativity, electro-magnetism, and quanta. He cites Lawrence's work, *Whitehead's Philosophical Development: A Critical History of the Background of Process and Reality* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1956) as an able presentation of the interpretation to which he is opposed.

Leclerc's main thesis is, therefore, that in *Process and Reality* Whitehead meets an entirely new set of problems which are properly metaphysical. And so, in the first chapter, Leclerc shows how Whitehead's earlier interest in problems of the philosophy of science finally led him to other questions that were properly metaphysical. In the next chapter, Leclerc takes up the crucial point of establishing the specifically metaphysical

nature of Whitehead's endeavor. To do this, Leclerc assembles and underlines explicit statements of Whitehead himself. Leclerc concludes that Whitehead places himself in the philosophical tradition of Aristotle when he says that *the* problem of *Process and Reality* is "to conceive a complete [παντελής] fact." Leclerc thinks that this is essentially the same problem as the one posed in Aristotle's metaphysics. Also, Leclerc points out that, in agreement with Aristotle and opposition to Plato, Whitehead holds that it is "fully existent" things which are the principal concern of metaphysics. For this reason, what Whitehead terms the "ontological principle" becomes the keystone of his metaphysics.

The third chapter gives a more refined exposition of the metaphysics proper to Whitehead. In terms of procedure, Leclerc describes this as "precisely the elaboration of a scheme of ideas and the testing of that scheme, internally by the criteria of coherence, logical consistency, and necessity in universality, and externally by its applicability and adequacy" (p. 48).

In the chapters that follow, the author carefully selects the central notions of Whitehead's scheme and explains them one at a time, introducing only the related ideas that he judges really essential to grasp that particular notion. Throughout, he calls attention to any simplifications made for the sake of clarity, and later on he tries to rectify the simplification so far as he can within the limits of an introductory exposition.

There can be no doubt about the quality and usefulness of Leclerc's study. Although this book is exclusively a work of exposition, Leclerc's appreciation of Whitehead's metaphysics is apparent. In view of this fine piece of exposition we can look forward to the critical study that Leclerc mentions in the preface. And we can hope to see fully treated some thorny problems touched upon in the course of this exposition; for example, the sense in which "actual entity" is preferable to "being" because the latter term is thoroughly ambiguous (p. 19); how it is that Whitehead is not inevitably driven to incoherence to account for the difference of things (p. 166); how God can be a unique "actual entity" and yet not be an exception (p. 193). Finally, we must look to the critical study for a full discussion of the adequacy of Whitehead's metaphysical scheme that is closed to the possibility of a transcendent God and so ends, not in mystery, but in the obscurity of God as an accident of "creativity."

Reality, Reason and Religion. **By Arthur Anton Vogel. New York: Morehouse-Gorham Co., 1957. Pp. xi + 208. $3.00.**

In our scientific age it is important for philosophers to show how and why the positivistic approach defaults in its attempt to give adequate explanations even of our empirical world. Dr. Vogel does this, not by giving pat, desiccated answers so often associated with the Scholastic tradition but by confronting the positivistic-minded with a vital metaphysics having its roots in Aristotle, enriched by Aquinas, and freshly interpreted in our own times by such men as Gilson, Maritain, de Finance, Klubertanz, and Wild. The last-mentioned is singled out by the author as a special influence on his own thought. For those who have followed the growth of metaphysics in the above-mentioned men there is little of the positive development that is new. Yet those who have breadth of mind and leisure to ponder Vogel's confrontation of modern thought with an existential metaphysics will find this book a stimulating and not unrewarding challenge.

Though at first glance the various topics seem loosely strung together, still, after considering the purpose of the book—namely, "to examine, explicate, and criticize the type of explanation called metaphysical, which had its definite origin in the thought of Aristotle"—the reader finds a close unity. Vogel, laying the foundations in Aristotle, singles out for special emphasis the theory of logical concept, the subject of metaphysics, and the notion of necessity and causal explanation. In the next two chapters, the author, recalling the positivistic criticism of the Aristotelean tradition, brings to light grave misunderstandings on the part of the positivists; and this he does by examining the assumptions and foundations of the positivistic viewpoint. Next comes the core of the book, an all-too-condensed justification for the metaphysical explanation of reality. The author applies the consequences of his existential and causal analysis of reality to certain contemporary theories in the philosophy of religion which are in sympathy with the positivistic approach. In turn he treats irrationalism, the extravagant claim for man's possible knowledge of the singular, and the "scientific" rejection of causal arguments for the existence of God.

The defense of the metaphysical approach involves not only the disposal of objections from the ouside but also the solution of the knotty problems from within. Thus Vogel in a straightforward manner considers the problem of the omnipotence and omniscience of God and the freedom of creatures. First he attempts to show that the explanation of the *praemotio physica* brings only confusion and no positive solution of the problem.

Even when we look at this problem from the viewpoint of God, we are likely to be troubled with double vision. With this caution he attempts a solution by sounding the depths of the existential principle of being—a solution that will not be as conceptually satisfying as the doctrine of physical premotion. "The energizing, dynamic, constantly flowing act of existence serves as an ever-present and continuous activitating injection into the essential staticism of a finite being, from a source which is intrinsic to the being of a thing considered as a whole" (p. 165). Thus for the author neither physical premotion nor any kind of concurrence is required. Too much weight seems to be credited to the "energizing force of the act of existing." Some influence over and beyond the creative and sustaining power of God seems to be called for in the operation of creatures, for in creatures operation and the to-be are simply not identical. However, since the to-be of limited being is also to-be-ordered-to-a-good, perhaps the resolution of the problem can be found in a more profound consideration of tendency, as the author suggests. This involves the simultaneous consideration of both efficient and final causes, a procedure that involves difficulties analogous, to some extent at least, to the difficulties that Heisenberg formulates in his uncertainty principle. We can hope that the author will elaborate on his abbreviated exposition.

Because he is human, the metaphysician finds it difficult to avoid slips into essentialism. On page 110 Vogel, in dealing with contingent being, says, ". . . such being is defined as that the essence of which does not imply its existence." Though the context does not mislead the reader, it would be more accurate to say "exercised existence." Again, on page 82 Vogel states, ". . . there would seem to be no crucial issue involved in contradicting Gilson and returning to the more usual view that every judgment at least implicitly links two concepts together." Such a consideration would not exactly be contradicting Gilson, for he says on page 231 of his *Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas*, "Now judgment is an operation of reason associating or dissociating concepts." A point for a bit more concern is the author's attitude towards Aristotle. Even though the author states that his metaphysical explanations go beyond Aristotle, still it seems to me that Vogel unduly credits Aristotle with an existential metaphysics because of the distinction that Aristotle makes in the second book of the *Posterior Analytics* between the questions whether a thing exists and what a thing is. (Cf. pages 10 and 11.) Aristotle's approach is open to an existential development, however, and so this insistence in no way detracts from the value of the book.

To single out all the points deserving of praise would take us beyond the confines of a short review. Worthy of note, however, are the author's insights into the primacy of the act of existing, the place that intentionality

of concepts and judgments has, and the function of tendency in finite being. We fondly hope that moderns of a positivistic cast of mind will take the trouble to study this work.

LINUS J. THRO, S.J., *Saint Louis University*

The Church and Modern Science. **By Patrick J. McLaughlin. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. 374. $7.50.**

Students and the general educated reader will be grateful for this collection of the principal allocutions of Pope Pius XII on modern science and technology. As was to be expected, they concern themselves with the proper Christian attitude toward new discoveries and their possible relations to Christian doctrine and morality, and do not pretend to develop a strictly philosophical theory of science. The translations, which are done by the compiler, are quite readable and seem on cursory examination to be accurate and adequate. A useful bibliography of all the papal pronouncements from 1939 to 1956 upon science and related subjects is appended. Another appendix gives a selected bibliography on science in relation to philosophy and religion. A name- and subject-index completes the apparatus.

The book as a whole is unlikely to appeal strongly to the non-Catholic scientist or philosopher of science. The lengthy introductory part of the book, whose structure is that of commentary and elaboration upon papal pronouncements on the place of science in the Christian perspective, proposes to facilitate communication between the scientist and the philosopher. In this aim, the author might have been successful, if his exposition met with no basic religious differences and with sufficient philosophical indifference (or ignorance). If, in other words, the scientist is a Catholic, the presentation of "some philosophy for the scientist" may promote communication, but not at a high level of understanding; for the philosophy offered by Father McLaughlin is at best that common patrimony of accepted terms and theses wherein we may "all say the same thing" and meet in superficial agreement. If the Catholic is a philosopher, he may well find the expositions of the theory of science informative; he will probably consider the epistemology and metaphysics eclectic and philosophically spineless, and the popularized treatment of the proofs of the existence of God quite inadequate; he will surely be disconcerted at the placid fashion in which diametric oppositions of philosophical appraisal are brushed over or ignored. His rueful reaction may be that science and

philosophy will never sail together in harmony and mutual aid, if philosophy is first dismantled and scuttled.

EDWARD MACKINNON, S.J., *Weston College*

Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. **By Michael Polanyi. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. xiv + 428. $6.75.**

Polanyi was originally trained as a doctor of medicine and later achieved fame as a physical chemist. For the last nine years he has served as a nonlecturing professor at the University of Aberdeen working almost exclusively on the present book. The resulting highly ambitious work presents a novel interpretation of knowledge in general and of scientific knowledge in particular, develops a theory of reality consonant with this epistemology, and indicates the place of the individual in this framework and his consequent obligations. In the brief outline that follows we shall concentrate on the general theory of knowledge presented.

The opening section, entitled "The Art of Knowing," is intended to be a refutation of *objective* theories of knowledge. Though the term "objective" is never clearly defined, it seems to refer to the general tendency to envisage science as an impersonal collection of facts and theories, and to refer especially to any attempt to reduce the creative insight of scientific discovery to a few pat rules of procedure. Such prescriptions of scientific method work only in simplified presentation of the paradigms of science: Copernicus against Ptolemy, the rejection of phlogiston and the mechanical ether. Through various examples Polanyi shows that the solution of live issues depends on the personal insight of a competent scientist. Such insights form the subject of the present study.

Polanyi begins his critical examination of personal knowledge on an elementary level. The swimmer's skill, the pianist's touch, the weaver's art, and the wine-biber's connoisseurship all represent knowledges which scientific study can penetrate only by the most painstaking effort. The author uses Gestalt psychology to explain these skills in terms of a focal awareness on objects, or goals, and a subsidiary awareness of parts, or of tools as extensions of self. Even intellectual tools, such as the premises and interpretative framework of science, are known only through a subsidiary awareness. These premises are articulated only by changing their nature, making them objects of focal rather than subsidiary awareness. Accordingly, the next point to be examined is the interrelation of the articulate and tacit components of knowledge.

Experiments on animal learning and the author's own interpretation of

the semantic problem point to the same conclusion. The tacit component of knowledge, comprehension striving to achieve articulation, is responsible for all progress. The paradoxical fact that language molds the mind of the educated man and ultimately determines the structure of thought is reconciled with the primacy of the tacit component by a reinterpretation of language. Language is not a mere set of symbols manipulated according to rules of grammar. It has a depth of meaning acquired through the insights that shaped its usage and modified the meaning of words until language could express what it had previously been incapable of expressing.

Such language, embodying a collective understanding, is a premise of science. Another premise is the "community of scientists." Any given individual can acquire competence in but a tiny corner of science. Yet, by becoming accepted as a member of this self-accrediting community he participates in the body of knowledge and the developing dialogue that constitute science. What is the basis on which such knowledge rests? Ultimately it is a-critical. The act of understanding carries its own standard of rightness, which is not reducible to any set of rules and incites intellectual passions for a beauty which betokens the reality of its conceptions. Thus an act of understanding is implicitly a personal commitment to the superior culture which molded the basis of understanding. Truth, for this author, is nothing but the explicitation of this identity between expression and commitment. One can learn and know only by accepting the accidental circumstances, right or wrong, of one's personal existence as the concrete opportunity for exercising intellectual responsibility. Through this line of reasoning the explicit purpose of the book is fulfilled. "The principal purpose of this book is to achieve a frame of mind in which I may hold firmly to what I believe to be true though I know it might conceivably be false" (p. 214).

In a further section the author gives a detailed discussion of the ascending levels of biological life. From the proper activities of individuals he argues to the existence of "centers," new units, which cannot be explained by reduction to their component parts. This biological hierarchy leads to a supreme level, an ultrabiology, which is the superior culture with its concomitant commitments.

The final justification of his philosophical system is given in his theory of evolution, a dynamic process of achievement leading from the simple elements in the primordial incandescent gas—which, he hints, may have some kind of consciousness—through the development of higher centers of activity to the formation of the *noosphere*. The logic of the evolutionary achievement points to an unknown future. Man must commit himself to realizing its achievement, for he has no other meaningful alternative.

This carefully elaborated and highly integrated work is presented as a complete philosophical system. As such, it merits respect and deserves careful study. However, it also deserves criticism. The road to idealism generally begins with exclusive preoccupation with the structure of knowledge. In such a system the bridge between knowledge and reality must be found in some aspect of knowledge itself, such as consistency or, as here, the intellectual passion excited by the beauty of knowledge. Polanyi is obviously striving to be a realist rather than an idealist. Yet his attention is focused on the frontiers of scientific theory where hypothesis rather than sure knowledge of an extramental world is the guide. Here realism looks untenable. Idealism, or complete skepticism, is circumvented by the act of commitment. If this is accepted a-critically the whole intellectual edifice rests on an explicitly irrational foundation. To put this commitment on a critical realistic basis the author must make a more careful examination of what he calls "the paradox of self-set mental standards." These self-set standards rest on the fact that man not only can know reality directly, but in such direct knowledge he can also have a critical awareness of his own ability to know reality correctly. This criticism notwithstanding, the present book offers a theory of knowledge based on extensive scientific experience, a theory which has a surprising number of points in common with the Thomistic doctrine of knowledge and intellectual habits. Those interested in the problem of knowledge or the philosophy of science can find much of value in this work.

VERNON J. BOURKE, *Saint Louis University*

An Inquiry into Goodness. **By F. E. Sparshott. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. xiv + 304. $5.50.**

This book was written by an Oxford scholar who has taught ethics at the University of Toronto for several years. Sparshott is to be a visiting professor at Northwestern during the coming year. The theme of this work is much the same as that of dozens of British treatises in ethics: What do we mean when we say that *X* is good? This is an inexhaustible subject of discussion, as G. E. Moore, W. D. Ross, R. M. Hare, S. E. Toulmin, A. C. Ewing, P. H. Nowell-Smith, and many others have shown.

Actually Sparshott's work is a good introduction to the literature and methods of contemporary ethical theory in England. It is less helpful on American ethics; R. B. Perry and C. L. Stevenson come into the picture, but Dewey, Edel, and Riesman are merely mentioned. The book completely ignores Continental thinking, except that of the classical or mediaeval

writers. At one point (p. 255), it is stated that English philosophers are reared on Kant, Plato, and Descartes; oddly, Plato is the only one of these writers who deserves mention elsewhere in the book.

Common language analysis, in a broad sense, is the method used by Sparshott, plus borrowing from miscellaneous thinkers from the history of philosophy. The discussion centers on the ways in which various philosophers have used the word "good" and the ways in which it is used in the ordinary speech of England today. Some of these analyses are reminiscent of Plato in the early dialogues. A formula is set up and then criticized because certain accepted usages or examples do not seem to fit under it. The reader should also be forewarned regarding the "humour" —things vanish into thin Ayer; there is an intricate problem involving Mr. Dandrough and Mr. Swetband, and some possibly amusing references to the local scene in Toronto which escape even this former Torontonian.

Chapter 6 contains the meat of Sparshott's thinking. He there presents this formula: "To say that x is good is to say that it is such as to satisfy the wants of the person or persons concerned." This is offered as a statement of the univocal meaning of good. Each part of this formula is then discussed at some length. The notion of "wants" is operative in the whole thing; and Sparshott is rather close, at times, to portions of the classic Greek analysis of the needs of human nature. However, he finds it hard to make up his mind about persons; some brute animals may be persons. In the course of the discussion, Aquinas's views on the meaning of good are described and criticized (pp. 205-7). One Thomistic approach to goodness is that of desirability, another that of perfection. In Sparshott's judgment these are not reconciled by St. Thomas Aquinas. The point is difficult: How relate the transcendental good of metaphysics with the moral good? It can hardly be settled in two pages.

The last part of the book is devoted to a comparison of the above formula of the good with other positions in ethics. Some American readers may find the work lacking in seriousness and precision. This is deceptive. Sparshott is probably interested in what he is doing, but one of the fundamental rules of British philosophical gamesmanship is never to say anything which will enable a critic to catch you off base.

FREDERICK SCOTT, S.J. *Loyola College, Baltimore, Md.*

Hegel und Blondel. **By Peter Henrici. Pullach bei München: Berchmanskolleg, 1958. Pp. xix + 206.**

The dialectical methods used by Hegel in his *Phänomenologie des Geistes* and by Maurice Blondel in his *L'Action* (1893) are here compared in an attempt to find some solution to the problem of the relation of a philosophical system and the fact of the Christian revelation. Without any actual historical dependence, both philosophers, it is claimed, sought to construct a philosophy of the concrete (the union of the universal and the singular) in the form of a panlogism (reason for Hegel and the reintegration of life into thought for Blondel). But how is a dialectic to be constructed which will allow all possible data to be introduced into strictly philosophical thought? Hegel's method on a one dimensional level of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis led him to identify reason and reality, and hence to exclude the possibility of accepting mystery and historical witnesses and truths. Blondel's method of a genuine antinomy between fact and necessity, which is resolved by a transcendent on the third dimensional level, allowed his philosophy to be "open" to them.

Henrici has made good use of the recent studies on Hegel's *Phänomenologie* and his early theological period. There is very little to say by way of comment on the author's presentation of Hegel's method, which is rather well known. My remarks then will be limited to his interpretation of Blondel, who may not be so well known in this country.

Blondel, in the introduction of his book, clearly states that he intended to use the "indirect way," or the method of science which eliminates all possible solutions to a problem except one. This method is operative from the very beginning. It seems very arbitrary, if not false, to make the method operative only with the problem of sense knowledge (p. 43 of *L'Action*) just to make it similar to Hegel's starting point. Henrici requires Blondel's dialectic to rest on the presuppositions expressed in the first forty-two pages. The novelty of Blondel's method was that it rested on no suppositions.

There is no need for Henrici to distinguish a " direct way" (the study of action) and an "indirect way" (an analysis of subjectivity) to show how Blondel executed the second step of his dialectic (p. 70). At this stage of the book action *is* subjectivity. In several other places (p. 105 and p. 112) Henrici draws general conclusions about Blondel's thought and method from data which can be properly judged only at the end of *L'Action*. The mention of Blondel's "metaphysics of the second power" (p. 151, footnote) is out of place in connection with the proofs of the existence of God. Blondel does not speak of such a metaphysics (which Henrici does not

mention) till page 464 of his book and there only as something yet to be constructed, because it would deal with an approach to being not assumed in his thesis but given in the public edition as incorporating his replies to the objections of his examiners. Hence it is also difficult to appreciate the importance Henrici assigns to what he calls Blondel's "metaphysics of judgment" (p. 173). This is using modern language to describe a situation which it does not fit. The use of the word *existentiell* (though defined on p. 36, footnote) in this same context, in addition to the above criticism, forces one to conclude that the thought and method of *L'Action* have not been clarified but rather obscured by the author.

JAMES COLLINS, *Saint Louis University*

Critique of Religion and Philosophy. **By Walter Kaufmann. New York: Harper & Bros., 1958. Pp. xvii + 325. $5.00.**

Walter Kaufmann is a professor of philosophy at Princeton University and the author of numerous articles and books, especially on Nietzsche and existentialism. In the present work he seeks to offer a general critical evaluation of philosophy and religion. One major problem facing any such ambitious project is to find a way of dealing with the wide variety of actual philosophies and religions. Kaufmann follows a fourfold program for meeting this difficulty within the covers of a single volume.

First, he takes his start not with what the history of philosophy shows to be the main currents but with the two most prevalent philosophies in our own day: analytic philosophy and existentialism. By regarding these as expressions of two permanent philosophical tendencies of man, he attains a certain level of generality about philosophy as such. Next, he chooses for the present to confine his scrutiny to three major religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Buddhism (especially the presently popular Zen Buddhism). Since they contain typical religious responses to man's situation, a study of them also achieves a certain type of generality about the religious mind. In the third place, the philosophies and religions under consideration are approached by means of long aphorisms, somewhat in the style of Nietzsche rather than through a laborious systematic argumentation. The aphorisms express the author's direct reactions to the themes under discussion, with stress upon his awareness of weak points in the existing positions and upon his own aspirations toward a more adequate view. Finally, as the book develops, it becomes clear that the analysis of philosophy is being definitely subordinated to the analysis of

religion. Everything else in the book is instrumental to the religious concern and the polemic it engenders.

To appraise the present critique, each of these points of method must be examined for its effectiveness in dealing with philosophy and religion. Only the first seventy pages deal formally with the theme that existentialism and analytic philosophy express the permanent directions of philosophic thought. The hypothesis is not tested through the usual means of comparing it with the chief types of philosophy known through conventional histories. It remains in the status of a genial suggestion which will probably sharpen our reading of familiar texts hereafter but which will also have to undergo some rigorous testing and prosaic qualifying in the light of other specific ways of philosophizing. But if one leaves aside the historical claim and concentrates upon the direct treatment of existential and analytic views, then one will find here many witty and perceptive remarks.

> The analysts are generally most reliable in single sharp analyses; but when they attempt to construct a larger picture, whether of ethics or the mind, their partiality stands revealed. Existentialism, on the other hand, suffers from two great dangers. First, it tends to ignore the ordinary for the extraordinary and to mistake the uncommon for the rule. Secondly, it does not demand of itself, let alone achieve, the greatest possible clarity of which its often difficult subject matter is capable. Obviously, existentialism is more interesting for nonphilosophers, while professionals can learn more from the analysts.

It would be difficult to sum up the comparison more concisely and more pointedly.

In dealing with religion, Kaufmann's main negative aim is to show that Western theistic philosophers have failed to provide an adequate rational justification for the truth of God's existence. He criticizes Plato, Anselm, Aquinas, Pascal, and Kant. The handling of Aquinas has several noteworthy features. It is confined to the *Summa Theologiae*, a move which enables the author to exclaim about how the "five ways" seem to stand alone and yet how they depend upon so much and entail so much else for their proper understanding. Kaufmann feels somehow tricked by the circumstance that the demonstrative force of these ways depends upon a prior metaphysical analysis of things, whereas the whole point of the treatment in the *Contra Gentiles* is precisely to make us so sharply aware of this metaphysical basis that we will never forget about it. He also adds that since the article in the *Summa Theologiae* recommending that heretics be turned over to the tender mercies of the civil authorities is

proved by exactly the same format as the truth of God's existence, one who has qualms about the former should extend his doubts to the latter demonstration. But this criticism is not so much a solution as the beginning of a problem in interpretation of the relation between literary form and demonstrative claim. The careful historical attention which we would want to accord to the problem of how statements are related in Hegel and Nietzsche should also be applied in the case of Aquinas, who does not have a wooden uniformity of intent and reasoning in these two cases. Kaufmann advances an interesting objection drawn from American political practice against the third way. He suggests that just as senators have staggered terms, so contingent beings are staggered so that at no time are they all nonexistent. The question then is to examine the factors which determine the particular arrangement of staggered terms in existence on the part of composite beings.

The author has some subtle thoughts concerning the use of aphorisms. He notes that in Nietzsche's case this literary form was due to a superabundance of insights which kept cropping out and to an excess in penetration into the many facets of a question. On the other hand, aphorisms sometimes signify one's inability to build a coherent structure of thought. Kaufmann indicates that, in his own case, he would rather express what he has seen and do so in a somewhat gappy fashion than to worship the finely wrought system. This is a choice which both analysts and existentialists recommend. It also fits in with the author's teaching that truth cannot be reached except through aspiration and expectation. If truth is a "correspondence of promise and performance, a consistency that is not established once for all but continuing and open toward the future," then the use of long aphorisms is fitted to the search. Yet the drawbacks of this form also have to be accepted. Whatever the disadvantages of Kant's style and organization, he did develop a critical approach which cannot be matched for thoroughness of argument and presentation of evidence by a critique developed along aphoristic and lecture-period lines. Zarathustra can dance around Kant and pierce his moral theism with a brilliant psychological observation, but the stolid old plodder is back at his post the next day and the painful work of long-range analysis and inference goes on.

Kaufmann touches upon a thousand points in Biblical criticism and religious psychology that lie beyond the present reader's competence to evaluate. One would have to inquire, for instance, about whether it is still advisable to rely upon Albert Schweitzer as the authority on the issue of Christ's eschatological consciousness. On a more general plane, however, the difference of treatment accorded to Judaism and Zen Buddhism

on the one side and to Christianity on the other is quite noticeable. As far as Buddhism is concerned, the author takes the attitude of the careful reporter, quoting long passages for the purpose of increasing our historical understanding of this movement. Excesses are attributed to other forms of Buddhism than Zen, which is presented in a sympathetic light. Similarly, the Jewish tradition of the Old Testament and later writings is sympathetically studied. The nondogmatic, humorous attitude of the rabbinical masters is conveyed through several genially presented stories. The only critical stiffening occurs when any definite statements about God are drawn from the Old Testament by Jewish and other theologians. But the New Testament, the Christian church, and the Christian theological tradition are insistently criticized at every turn.

Behind this difference of treatment is the philosophical alternative that man either hypostasizes and objectifies his highest aspirations or tries to lift himself to a higher level of being. The former is the way of idolatry, and it is followed by all religions except nondogmatic, moral Judaism and Zen Buddhism. This alternative (although not its special religious form) is a traditional one in existentialist circles since the time of Feuerbach. It rests on the supposition that every objectively formulated proposition involves the consequence of claiming to reduce the reality in question to the condition of a thing subordinate to our mind and its proposition-forming function. But this entailment does not hold necessarily by the simple fact of making the judgment and giving it propositional formulation. Reduction to a thing-object is a distinct issue and requires separate consideration. In the case of our human thoughts about God, the concurrent use of the way of transcendence is an indication that this reduction is explicitly refused as being improper and unfounded in our experience.

Toward the end of his treatise, Kaufmann hazards the (non-objectifying) statement that "philosophy is poetry with an intellectual conscience, poetic vision subjected to rational scrutiny." This is a propositional sentence, which is nevertheless not intended to transform the philosophical effort into an object cut off from subjective aspiration and the expectations of truth-seeking. Moreover, this sentence stresses the need for rational scrutiny of the evidence in favor of this particular conception of philosophy and of religion. The work of studying the relevant data and presenting the results in humanly communicable form requires some propositional formulations. They are not automatically tagged hypostasizations and objectifications of the spiritual reality into a dead thing, because this latter question is a separate matter and has to be determined on its own merits. In the case of philosophies and religions which diverge from Kaufmann's standpoint, it is also impossible to attach a wholesale tag of

objectification and idolatry. One must first inquire whether any safeguards are provided against such a consequence.

VERNON J. BOURKE, *Saint Louis University*

Medieval Thought. Saint Augustine to Ockham. **By Gordon Leff. Penguin Books, 1958. Pp. 317. Paper, 85¢**

Gordon Leff is a young British scholar, a graduate of Cambridge now lecturing in medieval history at Manchester University. His book surveys the history of ideas in the period indicated in the subtitle. As another sketch, in the style of which the British seem so fond, it does not contain much that will be of interest to specialists. Indeed, Leff has reviewed his own work in his preface:

> In writing this book I have throughout been only too aware of my dependence upon previous scholarship; although the emphases are mine, I make no claim to novelty in what I have written, except on certain aspects of fourteenth century thought. My debt is at once too general and too vast to be acknowledged individually.

This modest self-judgment is just. If one has read Gilson or Father Copleston, there is not much point to going through this book. On the other hand, students and teachers of medieval history may find this dependable digest less demanding than a technical history of medieval philosophy.

In treating the fourteenth century Leff emphasizes the problem of faith and reason. He sees the period of Scotus and Ockham not as a new battleground for the adherents of realism and nominalism but for the respective claims of revelation and natural experience. As the century progresses, there is a gradual freeing of faith from the domain of reason. Bradwardine (of whose thought Leff has made a thorough study) is presented as the climax of this emancipation of God from nature, of primary causality from secondary, of the teachings of revelation from those of reason. (It comes as no surprise to find Portalié listed in the brief bibliography as the only study of St. Augustine; faith and reason constituted the focal point of Portalié's interests.) In point of fact, as the author says, "there is much in Bradwardine's reliance upon Scripture and the irrevocability of the divine will which is to be found in the Reformers of the sixteenth century" (p. 299).

It is difficult to find one theme, or problem, which unifies and brings clarity to an exposition of a thousand years of human thinking. Were the thinkers of the Middle Ages most concerned with the one and the many, or with the problem of universals, or with the relation between what is contingent and what is necessary, or with the harmonization of the speculative and the practical—or with any of a dozen other key problems? Certainly the faith-reason theme is one of these central questions running through the whole period.

ROLAND J. TESKE, S.J., *Saint Louis University*

Le dilemme du concours divin: primat de l'essence ou primat de l'existence? **By Louis Rasolo, S.J. Rome: Gregorian Univ., 1956. Pp. 134.**

Father Rasolo has added to the still-growing literature of the Thomist-Molinist controversy by re-examining the problem of general concursus in the light of modern Thomistic existentialism. He concludes interestingly that the Molinists have held the true existential view of St. Thomas and that the Bannesians are essentialists giving priority to determination. He justifies the a-posteriori approach of Molina and identifies Neo-Molinism with indifferent concursus and the *scientia media* without discussing the latter. The main point of the book is that in terms of proper causality God causes the existence of the will act—an *esse accidentale*—and man causes the limitation of the will act to the choice of one of the means to the end.

The author believes that the Bannesian tendency to make not only the act of being but also its determination dependent upon the divine will either in the order of being or in the order of activity destroys the duality of the determination and the act of being. The creature depends upon God in two lines of causality, exemplarity and efficiency; in its essence the creature depends upon the divine intellect, but in its being the creature is dependent upon the divine will. To destroy this duality is to destroy the meaning of essence and nature as the immutable foundation and norm of human morality. Hence, Bannesianism is voluntaristic insomuch as it makes determination dependent upon the divine will. Bannesianism destroys the essential autonomy of the creature as well as its proper causality.

With regard to the act of the will, Bannesians maintain that the determination of the will is a positive perfection of being. The act

of choice is new perfection and actuality that remove the potentiality of the indifferent will-to-end. Thus, in order to remove this potentiality of the indifferent will-to-end, a further *praemotio* is needed for the act of choice, and this premotion is physically predetermining. The indifference of the will-to-end, according to Father Rasolo, is not the indifference of potentiality but of transcendent act. In willing the end the will is in full act; the act of choice merely limits the will act to the willing of one of the means to the end. It is by one and the same motion that the will is moved to the willing of the end and to the choice of one of the means to the end. Hence, the act of choice is the proper effect of the created will; no new premotion is required since the will is already in full act. Thus only one premotion is required to move the will to intend the end, and this cannot be a physical predetermination of the act of choice. Thus the author concludes that indifferent premotion that moves the will to intend the end is the sole possibility.

Father Rasolo's analysis of the relation of the will-to-end and the act of choice as one of transcendent act to limited act seems correct and valuable inasmuch as it removes the unnecessary physically predetermining motion by which the Bannesians claim the will is moved to the act of choice. The emphasis on proper causality is also valuable for working toward a solution to this problem. However, the assumption of an accidental act of being really distinct from the substantial act of being is a weak point in the argument that remains unproved and certainly does weaken the unity of being, as the author admits. Moreover, even granting the accidental act of being and the analysis in terms of proper causality, the act of being must nonetheless be related to its determination as act to potency. Thus even in terms of proper causality indifferent concursus is impossible, since God causes the actuality of the operation that is naturally prior to, and proportioned to, the limitation caused by the will. Certainly, with temporal simultaneity God causes the actuality of the *velle*, and the creature causes the limitation of the *velle* to this or that particular good; but the causality of God is naturally prior to that of the creature as *esse* is to essence. Hence, only in the former and not in the latter sense can one maintain indifferent concursus and the Thomistic act-potency relation between *velle* and its limitation. Finally, though it is true that the Bannesians were essentialists at least in the sense which the author has pointed out, Molina too was an essentialist: and to claim that Molinists have maintained the existential import of the doctrine of St. Thomas whereas the Bannesians have not is to lose historical perspective.

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———. *The Historical and Mystical Christ.* Trans. Angeline Bouchard. Chicago: Fides, 1958. Pp. xviii + 502. $7.50.

HIRSCHBERGER, JOHANNES. *The History of Philosophy.* Vol. I. Trans. Anthony N. Fuerst. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1958. Pp. xiv + 516. $8.00.

HUTIN, SERGE. *La philosophie anglaise et américaine.* Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958. Pp. 128. Paper.

JACOBY, J. E. *Across the Night.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. Pp. xii + 110. $3.75.

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(Continued on inside cover)

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN NORTH AMERICA

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format, and the like.

"Publication in North America" will be understood to refer not only to works originally published in that area, but also to works originally published in some other country and simultaneously or subsequently issued by some North American publisher under his own imprint. In the latter case (if it is known), the book will be marked by the symbol ‡ in the left hand margin.

The procedure is as follows:

1. *Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.*
2. *Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.*
3. *Books received by* The Modern Schoolman *will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.*

Abelard, Peter. *The Story of My Misfortunes.* Trans. from the Latin by Henry Adams Bellows. Introd. by Ralph Adams Cram. Glencoe: Free Press, 1958. Pp. 96. $3.50.

Abrams, M. H. (ed.) *Literature and Belief.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. xvii + 184. $3.75.

Adler, Alfred. *The Education of the Individual.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. Pp. [7] + 143. $3.50.

The purpose of the author is to show that each individual is a unique person, with his own value and his own development. He tries, moreover, to show concrete ways in which such uniqueness can be recognized and encouraged. The basic doctrine is built on the individual psychology of the late Alfred Adler. The method, as the author himself suggests, is influenced by Marcel Proust and Zen. The author is a humanist and shows some good ways to make literary passages relevant (or, perhaps, to draw out a child's potentialities by means of literature). Yet he does not live merely in books and the past; he insists that present and simple events and situations can present the same deep lessons. The book concludes with some stimulating thoughts on teaching, the influence of home life, and the function of love. There is a tendency to interpret religious truth as mythology.

There is no index.

Afnan, Scheil M. *Avicenna: His Life and Works.* New York: Macmillan Co.; Oct. 1958. $5.75.

Allen, G. F. L. *Buddha's Philosophy.* New York : Macmillan Co.; March, 1959. $4.75.

Allport, Gordon Willard. *The Nature of Prejudice.* Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1958. Pp. 518. Paper, $1.45.

Altmann, A., and Stern, S. M. (eds.) *Scripta Judaica.* Vol. I, *Isaac Israeli, A Neoplatonic Philosopher of the Early Tenth Century.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press; Nov., 1958. $4.80.

[Aristotle.] *On Poetry and Style.* Trans. with introd. by G. M. A. Grube. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xxxii + 110. Paper, 80¢

This is a new translation of the *Poetics* and of Chapters 1-12 of the third book of the *Rhetoric.* The text followed is usually that of Butcher. The translation is always excellent and often brilliant.

The introduction is one of the best, in spite of its brevity. Professor Grube judiciously observes that the value of the *Poetics* lies more in scattered observations and germinal ideas than in completeness or the adequacy of its treatment as a whole. He takes up for special comment the major points singled out by previous editors and commentators; his own remarks are always moderate, scholarly. In numerous footnotes he comments on the text or the translation, supplies background, elucidates a critical point. A final appendix (pp. 101-10) identifies and describes the proper names used in the texts.

This is an edition that both classical scholars and philosophers will buy with pleasure and use with profit.

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[——.] *The Pocket Aristotle.* Ed. Justin D. Kaplan; trans. N. D. Ross. New York: Pocket Books, 1958. Pp. 395. Paper, 50¢

Ashley, Benedict M., o.p. *Aristotle's Sluggish Earth: The Problematics of the 'De Caelo.'* River Forest, Ill.: Albertus Magnus Lyceum, 1958. Pp. viii + 73. Paper.

This extract from a doctoral dissertation was first published in the *New Scholasticism,* XXXII (1958); the present edition has a very brief introduction and a seven-page bibliography. It is a careful, detailed analysis and defense of the Aristotelian method of demonstration and an attempt to relate the Aristotelian science of nature to modern science.

Aurobindo, Sri. *Sri Aurobindo on Himself and on the Mother.* Westport, Conn.: Associated Booksellers; Sept., 1958. $5.00.

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Ayer, A. J. (ed.) *Logical Positivism.* Glencoe: Free Press; Dec., 1958. $6.00.

Bahm, Archie J. *Philosophy of the Buddha.* New York: Harper & Bros.; March, 1959. $3.00.

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‡ Barfield, Owen. *Saving the Appearances.* New York: Humanities Press, 1959. Pp. 190. $4.50.

‡ Barnett, S. A. (ed.) *A Century of Darwin.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 392. $5.75.

Barrett, William. *Irrational Man.* Garden City, Doubleday & Co. Pp. 278. $5.00.

Basson, A. H. *David Hume.* Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1958. Pp. 183 Paper, 85¢

This volume, in the well-received "Pelican Philosophy Series," is intended to serve as an introduction to Hume as a man, but principally to his philosophy. After a brief account of his life and writings, succeeding chapters present Hume's aims and methods, his doctrine on the imagination and on understanding, the relation between reason and morals, his statements about the nature of things (reality), and his thought as a skeptical philosophy.

The author's viewpoint is that of analytical philosophy. He assumes that Hume's contribution to philosophy is a great one and in many ways correct. Occasionally he challenges a particular conclusion; often he criticizes the arguments for conclusions which he nevertheless considers to be entirely correct.

BAY, CHRISTIAN. *The Structure of Freedom.* Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. xii + 419. $7.50.

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BERGSON, HENRI. *Philosophy of Poetry.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; March, 1959. $2.75.

———. *The World of Dreams.* Trans. Wade Baskin. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. Pp. 58. $2.75.

This is a translation of a lecture first published in the *Revue scientifique* of June, 1901. The author provides a historical introduction (pp. 1-20) and surveys the present stage of research on the subject, with some indications for further reading. The translation is clear and idiomatic.

The lecture itself relates the phenomenon of dreaming to Bergson's better known doctrines on time, sensation, and memory, and is an excellent short example of his method. It is a valuable addition to any library.

BERKELEY, EDMUND C. *Symbolic Logic and Intelligent Machines.* New York: Reinhold Pub. Co.; March, 1959. $6.50.

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DEWEY, JOHN. *Experience and Nature.* [Reprint.] New York: Dover Pubns.; January, 1959. $1.95.

DEWITT, CLINTON. *Privileged Communications between Physician and Patient.* Springfield: Charles C Thomas, 1958. Pp. 548. $11.50.

DICKINSON, GOLDSWORTHY LOWES. *The Greek View of Life.* Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1958. Pp. 261. Paper, $1.75.

‡ DIXON, WILLIAM MACNEILE. *The Human Situation.* Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1958. Pp. 443. Paper, 95¢

DONDEYNE, ALBERT. *Contemporary European Thought and Christian Faith.* Trans. Ernan McMullin and John Burnheim. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. xi + 211. $5.75; paper, $5.00.

The French original here translated was first published in 1951 under the title *Foi chrétienne et pensée contemporaine*, and noted in THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXX (1953), 250. For this translation, the original has been entirely rewritten. The first two chapters (on existential phenomenology and on the historicity of man) are entirely new; significant changes have been made in the remaining chapters, and the material has been quite differently arranged. In addition to phenomenology, the first part of the work deals also extensively with modern notions and treatments of irrationality. The second part deals with Thomism in relation to contemporary thought and with the relation between faith and reason.

The translators have made an unusual and unusually successful effort. Where necessary, they have indicated the translated word in parentheses; they have not taken the easy way of Anglicizing foreign

terms but the hard way of finding exact equivalents; in some cases they have kept the foreign word where no equivalent existed in English. In addition, they have supplied subject and author indices.

It is to be hoped that the reception accorded this work will be in proportion to its significance.

DOWD, DOUGLAS FITZGERALD (ed.). *Thorstein Veblen: A Critical Reappraisal.* Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 340. $5.00.

DUERING, I. *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition.* New York: Gregory Lounz. $9.50.

DURKHEIM, EMILE. *Moral Education.* Tr. Everett Wilson. Chicago: Free Press; April, 1959. $6.00.

‡ ECKHARDT, MEISTER. *Treatises and Sermons of Meister Eckhardt.* Selected and trans. from Latin and German with an introd. and notes by James M. Clark and John V. Skinner. New York: Harper & Bros., 1958. Pp. 267. $4.00.

EDDINGTON, SIR ARTHUR. *The Philosophy of Physical Science.* Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1958. Pp. 239. Paper, $1.75.

EDEL, ABRAHAM and EDEL, MAY. *Anthropology and Ethics.* Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas; February, 1959.

ELIADE, MIRCEA. *Yoga: Immortality and Freedom.* Trans. Willard R. Trask. New York: Pantheon Books, 1958. Pp. 530. $5.00.

ERDAILY, JOSEPH. *Philosophy for a New Civilization.* New York: Vantage Press, 1959. Pp. 318. $5.00.

The author is a professional plant breeder and shows himself to be well read in the classics, rather well informed in history, and acquainted with philosophy. As perhaps to be expected, the biological bias of his philosophy is strong, so much so that he stresses heredity to an almost extreme extent. In his metaphysics he is a naturalist and a materialist in a rather complex fashion. His "first cause" is an unlimited ubiquitous cosmic energy. This energy "precipitates" (the analogy from chemical reaction is deliberate and recognized by the author) into material things, according to a "cosmic idea" which is something like a Platonic Idea. Evolution is possible only within the limits of the species; the origin of new species takes place by the materialization of a new cosmic idea.

In epistemology, the author is a realist. The origin of ideas, in his explanation, is twofold: ideas either come from teaching or, if they are original ideas, by some kind of contact with a cosmic idea. He holds that belief (religious faith) is simply irreducible to knowledge, and that men are either believers or thinkers by biological necessity. His ethics is conservative; its basis is the noble man, or gentleman, and he deliberately assimilates good morals to aesthetics. The "new civilization" he proposes is to be attained by eugenics, though he lays very great stress on the good morals of the "reproducers" and insists that home training shall be personal, strict, moral, and loving.

The book shows again that good sense, a liberal education, and competence in a particular field can take a man far but are not likely to produce a balanced philosophy.

Essays in Philosophy. Ed. Houston Peterson and James Bayley. New York: Pocket Books; February, 1959. Paper, 50¢

FAGOTHEY, AUSTIN, S.J. *Right and Reason.* 2d ed. Saint Louis: C. V. Mosby Co.; January, 1959. $6.00.

FAUSSET, HUGH I'ANSON. *The Flame and the Light.* New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1958. Pp. 232. $5.00.

‡ FERGUSON, JOHN. *Moral Values in the Ancient World.* New York: Barnes and Noble; February, 1959. $4.50.

FERM, VERGILIUS TURE ANSELM (ed.). *A History of Philosophical Systems.* [Reprint.] Ames: Littlefield, Adams, 1958. Pp. 656. Paper, $2.25.

‡ FINDLAY, JOHN NIEMAYER. *Hegel.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. 372. $6.00.

FISHER, S. S. *Through Natural Laws to the First Great Cause.* New York: Greenwich Book Publishers, 1958. Pp. 133. $3.00.

FLEW, A. *A New Approach to Psychical Research.* New York: Humanities Press, 1959. Pp. 169. $2.25.

FRANKL, VIKTOR E. *From Death-Camp to Existentialism.* Preface by Gordon W. Allport. Boston: Beacon Press, June, 1959. Pp. 175 (approx.). $3.00.

[FRANKLIN, BENJAMIN.] *Autobiography and Other Writings.* Ed. Russell B. Nye. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1958. Pp. 221. Paper, 75¢

FRIEDLÄNDER, PAUL. *Plato: An Introduction.* Trans. Hans Meyerhoff. Vol. I. New York: Pantheon Books, 1958. Pp. 423. $5.00.

FRITZ, KURT VON. *Aristotle's Contribution to the Practice and Theory of Historiography.* Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1958. Pp. 24. Paper, 50¢

FROMM, ERICH. *Sigmund Freud's Mission.* New York: Harper and Bros.; February, 1959. $3.50.

GEIGER, GEORGE R. *John Dewey in Perspective.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press; Oct., 1958. $5.50.

GIERKE, OTTO. *Political Theories of the Middle Ages.* Trans. with introd. by Frederic William Maitland. Boston: Beacon Press; Sept., 1958. Paper, $1.95.

GLANVILL, JOSEPH. *Plus Ultra or the Progress and Advancement of Knowledge since the Days of Aristotle.* Introd. by Jackson I. Cope. Gainesville, Fla.: Scholars Facsimiles and Reprints, 1958. Pp. 216. $7.50.

GLEASON, ROBERT W., S.J. *The World to Come.* New York: Sheed & Ward, 1958. Pp. 172. $3.00.

This is a theological treatment of "the four last things" (death, judgment, heaven, and hell) with additional chapters on the relation between law and love, sin, redemptive suffering, and the resurrection. Contemporary philosophical themes, however, are prominent throughout, especially in the treatment of love, sin, and death; a full awareness of the most recent biblical theology is manifested, especially in the chapters on hell and the resurrection.

For English readers, the chapter on death is the first English presentation of philosophico-theological theories that are relatively well known to European philosophers and theologians.

GORMAN, MOTHER MARGARET. *The Educational Implications of the Theory of Meaning and Symbolism of General Semantics.* Washington, Catholic Univ. of America Press. Pp. 206. Paper, $2.25.

GRAHAM, JOHN *The Universal Military Obligation.* New York: Fund for the Republic, 1958. Pp. 14. Paper, 15¢

GREENE, JOHN C. *Death of Adam. Evolution and Its Impact on Western Thought.* Ames: Iowa State College Press; May, 1959. $5.00

GRENE, MARJORIE. *Introduction to Existentialism.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1959. Pp. 160. $1.25.

GUENON, RENÉ. *Man and His Becoming: According to the Vedanta.* New York: Noonday Press; Sept., 1958. $1.45.

GUITTON, JEAN. *Make Your Mind Work for You.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1958.

GUPTA, YOGI. *Yoga and Long Life.* New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1958. Pp. 160. $5.00.

HACKER, ANDREW. *Politics and the Corporation.* New York, Fund for the Republic. Pp. 13. Paper, 15¢

‡ Hadfield, J. A. *Psychology and Morals.* New York: Taplinger Pub. Co., 1958. Pp. 226. $3.50.

Hallie, Philip P. *Maine de Biran. Reformer of Empiricism.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; March, 1959. Pp. 256. $4.50.

Hand, Learned. *The Spirit of Liberty.* New York: Vintage Books; Feb., 1959. $1.25.

‡ Hanson, Norwood Russell. *Patterns of Discovery.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 249. $5.50.

Harris, Errol E. *Revelation through Reason.* New Haven, Yale Univ. Press. Pp. 170. $4.50.

Hart, Charles. *Thomistic Metaphysics. An Inquiry into the Act of Existing.* New York: Prentice-Hall; January, 1959. $5.50.

Hawton, Hector. *Philosophy for Pleasure.* New York: Fawcett Pubns.; April, 1959. Paper, 50¢

Hayakawa, S. I. *Our Language and Our World.* New York: Harper and Bros.; April, 1959. $5.00.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friederich. *Selection.* 2nd ed. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1958. Pp. 468. Paper, $1.00.

Heidegger, Martin. *Introduction to Metaphysics.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; March, 1959. $3.75.

———. *Question of Being.* Ed. William Kluback and Jean Wilde. New York: Twayne Pubs.; February, 1959. $3.00.

Heisenberg, Werner. *The Physicist's Conception of Nature.* Trans. from the German by Arnold J. Pomerans. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1958. Pp. 192. $3.75.

Himmelfarb, Gertrude. *Darwin and the Darwinian Revolution.* Garden City: Doubleday and Co.; April, 1959. $5.95.

Hirschberger, Johannes. *The History of Philosophy.* Vol. I. Trans. Anthony N. Fuerst. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1958. Pp. xiv + 516. $8.00.

This two-volume history of philosophy is well known and highly regarded. It enjoyed a wide circulation in the original German and has previously been translated into Spanish (the Spanish version was noted in The Modern Schoolman, XXXIV [March 1957], 205-6). The work is of a medium length for its topic; it treats most of the minor figures as well as the major ones. To see how it is proportioned, one can note that Plato is accorded seventy-three pages; Aristotle, eighty-one; St. Thomas Aquinas, fifty-one. The author is convinced that there is a perennial philosophy and that different philosophers have contributed to a common patrimony. Hence, he points out the lasting value of early contributions and stresses similarities rather than differences. These tendencies lead to what some historians will feel is a consistently benign interpretation; thus, the attitude of the Stoics toward the passions sounds harmoniously Christian; Aristotle is authentically and laudably Platonic in many things, and in turn foreshadows many Thomistic developments.

The first volume begins with the pre-Socratics and concludes with Nicholas of Cusa. The translation is excellent, and the translator has substitued English references and source materials wherever possible. There are both an index of proper names and a topical index; the latter, in particular, is very detailed.

Hocking, William Ernest. *Types of Philosophy.* 3d ed. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons; January, 1959. $5.00.

Holloway, Maurice, s.j. *Introduction to Natural Theology.* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts; March, 1959. $4.00.

Holton, Gerald (ed.). *Science and the Modern Mind.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. Pp. 119. $3.95.

Holzman, Donald. *Japanese Religion and Philosophy. A Guide to Japanese Reference and Research Materials.* Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; February, 1959. $4.00.

Hook, Sidney. *Political Power and Personal Freedom.* New York: Criterion Books; April, 1959. $7.50.

Huizinga, Johan. *Men and Ideas.* New York: Meridian Books, 1959. $4.00; paper, $1.45.

Hull, L. W. *The History and Philosophy of Science.* New York: Longmans, Green and Co.; March, 1959. $5.00.

Hume, David. *Selections.* 2nd ed. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1958. Pp. 401. Paper, $1.00.

Huxley, Julian S., and Others. *The Book That Shook the World.* Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press; Oct., 1958. Pp. 67. $1.50.

James, William. *The Varieties of Religious Experience.* New York: New American Lib., 1958. Pp. 424. Paper, 50¢

Jaspers, Karl. *The Idea of the University.* Trans. H. A. T. Reiche and H. F. Vanderschmidt. Ed. Karl W. Deutsch. Introd. by Robert Ulrich. Boston: Beacon Press; June, 1959. Pp. 192. $3.75.

———. *Truth and Symbol.* New York: Twayne Pubs.; April, 1959. $4.00.

Jeans, Sir James Hopwood. *The New Background of Science.* Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; March, 1959. Paper, $1.95.

———. *Physics and Philosophy.* Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1958. Pp. 222. Paper, $1.75.

Johnson, Oliver A. *Ethics: A Source Book.* New York: Holt & Co., 1958. Pp. 546. $5.75.

Jolivet, Regis. *The God of Reason.* Trans. from the French by Dom Mark Pontifex. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1958. Pp. 126. $2.95.

Jones, Howard Mumford. *Reflections on Learning.* New Brunswick, Rutgers Univ. Press. Pp. 97. $2.75.

Jones, Leland V. *Scientific Investigation and Physical Evidence.* Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas; February, 1959.

Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason.* Trans. from the German with an introd. by Norman Kemp Smith. Abridged ed. New York: Modern Lib , 1958. Pp. 353. $1.65.

———. *Selections.* 2nd ed. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1958. Pp. 526. Paper, $1.00.

Kaufmann, Walter. *From Shakespeare to Existentialism.* Boston: Beacon Press; June, 1959. Pp. 400 (approx.). $5.95.

‡ Keith, Arthur. *Darwin Revalued.* New York: Humanities Press, 1959. Pp. 294. $5.00.

Kelly, Gerald A., s.j. *Medico-Moral Problems.* St. Louis: Catholic Hospital Assn. of the U. S. and Canada, 1958. Pp. 375. Paper, $3.00.

Kemeny, John G. *Philosopher Looks at Science.* Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co.; Jan., 1959. $5.50.

Kierkegaard, Soren. *Journals.* Tr. Alexander Dru. [Reprint.] New York: Harper and Bros.; March, 1959. $1.45.

Kinkead, Eugene. *In Every War but One.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1959. $3.75.

Kneller, George F. *Existentialism and Education.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. Pp. xi + 170. $3.75.

The purpose of this book is principally to show the relevance of existentialist thought for education. After explaining his purpose, the author shows the reason for such thought and the problems in present-day educational practice, as well as theory, which may make such correlation significant.

The major part of the book is an exposition of existentialist thought —mainly that of Sartre, Heidegger, Marcel, and Kierkegaard— in a relatively nontechnical way. The author concentrates on the themes of existence itself, authenticity, knowledge, value (and especially moral and religious value), freedom, the individual and the group, and death, anguish, and commitment. This exposition is readable and quite good—instructive for the reader not well acquainted with the complex and often conflicting theories being reported.

Next, an attempt is made to show how these theories would have meaning for education. Naturally, most of the meaning lies in a criticism of present practice. In particular, the conformism which flows as much from instrumentalist, "progressive" education as from rationalistically orientated systems—if not even more—is shown to be one of the prime targets of existentialist thought.

Finally, the author attempts an evaluation. He shows that we cannot simply abandon content or standards, that anarchy or merely aristocratic systems will be no improvement, that there are social values. His final conclusion is that the most important contribution of existentialism could be to change the spirit in which education is carried on.

Knowledge and Value. Introductory Readings in Philosophy. Ed. Elmer Sprague and Paul W. Taylor. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1959. Pp. 717. $6.50.

KOFFKA, K. *Growth of the Mind.* [Reprint.] Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams and Co.; March, 1959. $1.95.

LAMONT, CORLISS. *Illusion of Immortality.* 2d ed. New York : Philosophical Lib.; March, 1959. $3.95.

LANGE, F. A. *History of Materialism.* [Reprint.] Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams and Co.; April, 1959. $3.95.

LANGER, SUSANNE K. *Reflections on Art. A Source Book of Writings by Artists, Critics, and Philosophers.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press; Dec., 1958. $6.50.

LAPIERE, RICHARD. *Freudian Ethic.* New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce; May, 1959.

LAUER, J. QUENTIN, S.J. *The Triumph of Subjectivity. An Introduction to Transcendental Phenomenology.* New York: Fordham Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. ix + 185. $4.00.

The thought of Husserl is not well known among English-speaking philosophers, even if they are able to read German with some fluency. Hence, a book devoted to an exposition of Husserl is most useful and timely.

The author expounds Husserl's thought, partly according to its genesis and partly according to the requirements of intelligible exposition. Thus, he begins with a general account of phenomenology. He then presents the first development of a "pure" psychology. Next, he stops to discuss basic phenomenological techniques. Then again he follows the development of Husserl's thought, presenting the theory of cognition as a theory of being, the notion of objectivity and that of transcendental subjectivity, and completes his exposition with chapters on the universal phenomenology of reason and the intentional explanation of the other. A last chapter discusses four later philosophers who were strongly influenced by Husserl: Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

Throughout, the author tries to expound clearly and carefully phenomenology as a concrete philosophy; he also attempts to relate it to other movements and ideas, and to show both its strengths and weaknesses.

Lazowick, Frank E. *One Dimensional System of Philosophy.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Nov., 1958. $6.00.

Leetham, Claude *Rosmini: Priest, Philosopher and Patriot.* Baltimore: Helicon Press; Sept., 1958. $7.50.

Lewis, Clive Staples. *The Allegory of Love.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 378. Paper, $2.25.

Lucretius Carus, Titus. *De Rerum Natura.* Trans. from the Latin into English verse by William Ellery Leonard. Introd. by Charles E. Bennett. [Reprint.] New York, Dial Press. Pp. 336. $5.00.

Lynch, William, s.j. *The Image Industries.* New York: Sheed & Ward; Apr., 1959. $3.00.

Lynch, William F., s.j. *Approach to the Metaphysics of Plato through the 'Parmenides.'* New York: University Pubs.; April, 1959. $6.00.

Maass, Arthur. *Area and Power: A Theory of Local Government.* Glencoe: Free Press; Nov., 1958. $5.00.

‡ Macintyre, A. C. *The Unconscious: A Conceptual Analysis.* New York: Humanities Press, 1958. Pp. 100. $2.50.

MacKendrick, Paul Lachlan. *The Roman Mind at Work.* Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1958. Pp. 191. Paper, $1.25.

Malcolm, Norman. *Ludwig Wittgenstein.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 107. $2.00.

Maritain, Jacques. *St. Thomas Aquinas.* Newly trans. and rev. by Joseph W. Evans and Peter O'Reilly. New York: Meridian Books, 1958. Pp. 281. Paper, $1.35.

– ——. *The Degrees of Knowledge.* New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons; Apr., 1959. Pp. 480. $7.50.

‡ Martin, R. M. *Truth and Denotation.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. 316. $7.50.

Mascall, Eric Lionel. *The Importance of Being Human.* New York, Columbia Univ. Press. Pp. 124. $3.00.

McCluskey, Neil Gerard, s.j. *Public Schools and Moral Education.* New York, Columbia Univ. Press. Pp. 327. $6.00.

McDonald, Donald. *Religion and Freedom.* New York: Fund for the Republic, 1958. Pp. 48. Paper, 25¢

McWilliams, James A., s.j. *Starman.* New York: Exposition Press, 1958. Pp. 143. $3.00.

This is a theological as much as, if not more than, a philosophical novel. Cast in the form of reports made by a member of another human race back to his people on a distant star system, it reports his discovery of our earth, his involvements with Christians and Communists, and his final decision to take an active part in earth affairs. Through discussions with persons from both sides, the "starman" reveals a human nature in a hypothetical "pure state of nature" and by contrast learns about the Christian doctrines of the Fall and the Redemption.

Melden, A. I. (ed.) *Essays in Moral Philosophy.* Seattle, Univ. of Washington Press. Pp. 228. $4.50.

Meyerhoff, Hans (ed.). *Philosophy of History in Our Time.* New York: Doubleday & Co.; Jan., 1959. $1.25.

[Mill, John Stuart.] *Nature* and *Utility of Religion.* Ed. with introd. by George Nakhnikian. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xxx + 80. Paper, 75¢

The text of these two works in the standard one; spelling and punctuation have been modernized.

The introduction briefly compares these two works, then turns to each separately. In speaking of *Nature*, the editor rehearses the

standard arguments against the "naturalistic fallacy." Then he tries to show that Mill's arguments destroy all natural-law theories. He refers to St. Thomas Aquinas and contemporary Thomists as holding one of these exploded theories. His argument shows that he simply has not understood—he may well have diligently read—either St. Thomas or any of the better contemporary Thomists. In speaking of the *Utility of Religion*, the editor asserts blandly that neither the existence of God nor the fact of a revelation can be proved. He maintains that they cannot be disproved, either, and holds that acceptance or rejection of these positions is a matter of temperament. Very Millsian views, these; it does not make them critically relevant.

MILLER, DAVID L. *Modern Science and Human Freedom.* Austin: Univ. of Texas Press; Nov., 1958. Pp. 400. $6.00.

MILLER, WILLIAM LEE, and OTHERS. *Religion and the Free Society.* New York: Fund for the Republic, 1958. Pp. 107. Paper, 50¢

MINNEMA, THEODORE. *The Social Ethics of Reinhold Niebuhr.* Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1959. $3.00.

MIXTER, RUSSELL L. (ed.) *One Hundred Years after Darwin.* Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1959. $4.00.

MONTEFIORI, ALAN. *Modern Introduction to Moral Philosophy.* New York: Frederick A. Praeger; March, 1959. $4.00.

MOORE, G. E. *Philosophical Studies.* [Reprint.] Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams and Co.; March, 1959. $1.75.

MORISON, ELTING ELMORE (ed.). *The American Style.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1958. Pp. 435. $5.00.

MOSKOWITZ, MOSES. *Human Rights and World Order.* New York: Oceana Pubns., 1958. Pp. 239. $3.95.

MUDRY, JOSEPH. *Philosophy of Atomic Physics.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. Pp. 136. $3.75.

This book is apparently supposed to be a basic (first) philosophy in harmony with, if not based upon, atomic physics. The author calls his system one of "dialectical-atomism." Here is how the author defines it: "The natural significance of this introductory term is two-fold. Predominantly figurative in this exposition will be a dialectical impressionism, which incidentally is nothing new as far as its innovations are concerned. The trend of deviation which will be apparent herein, will be in the sense, in which it will be applied to atomic fundamentalism. By this terminology, it is denoted that the basic structure of atoms will be taken into consideration; hence, the term: dialectical-atomism" (p. 1). On the basis of this, the author continues in similar style to criticize idealism and monism, to build up his notion of the material universe, to take account (?) of relativity and quantum mechanics, and finally to supply an explanation of value. "The awareness of these proclivities, wearing down the resistivity of the other, implies to inform us of the almost insurmountable odds that are associated in the acquisition of the good. . . . What does exhort salubriousness toward the rigidity of a status quo entity, does not equally apply to a general order. What does erectify itself conducive to salubriousness in one entity, may contrariously provoke maleficent instrumentalism towards another" (pp. 121-22). And the rest of the book is similarly mystifying.

MUNITZ, MILTON K. *Modern Introduction to Ethics.* Chicago: Free Press; Nov., 1958. $6.50.

MURPHY, GARDNER. *Human Potentialities.* New York: Basic Books, 1958. Pp. 350. $6.00.

MYERHOFF, HANS (ed.). *The Philosophy of History in Our Time. An Anthology.* Garden City: Doubleday & Co.; Jan., 1959. $1.25.

Nagel, Ernest, and Newman, James R. *Gödel's Proof.* New York, New York Univ. Press. Pp. 127. $2.95; paper, $1.75.

Nature of the Philosophical Enterprise, The. "Tulane Studies in Philosophy," Vol. VII. New Orleans: Tulane Univ. Bookstore, 1958. Pp. 146. Paper, $2.00.

There is a general theme to this volume, that of the nature of philosophy. Edward G. Ballard, in "The Subject-Matter of Philosophy," holds that it is "archaic experience." Richard L. Barber, in "Philosophic Disagreement and the Study of Philosophy," states that the study of the history of philosophy requires the student to assume that each philosopher in turn may be entirely correct. James K. Feibleman, in "An Explanation of Philosophy," explains that philosophy is concerned with the totality of all there is, that it consists of a number of disciplines, and that each of them is of value to the student. Harold N. Lee, in "Philosophy and the Categories of Experience," looks on philosophy as the formulation and criticism of categories. Paul Guerrant Morrison, in "The Nature of Analytic Philosophy," gives a short explanation of current analysis. Andrew J. Reck, in "Wilmon H. Sheldon's Philosophy of Philosophy," presents and evaluates Sheldon's work. Louis Nisbet Roberts, in "Is the Study of Aesthetics a Philosophic Enterprise?" asserts that it is. Robert C. Whittemore, in "Philosophy as Comparative Cosmology," considers philosophy as a framing of a categoreal scheme, in the manner of Whitehead.

Nelson, John Charles. *Renaissance Theory of Love.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 280. $5.50.

Newman, John Henry Cardinal. *The Idea of a University.* Garden City: Doubleday & Co.; Feb., 1959. $1.35.

[——.] *The Political Thought of John Henry Newman.* Ed. Terence P. Kenny. New York: Longmans, Green & Co.; Mar., 1959. $5.00.

O'Connor, D. J. *The Philosophy of Education.* New York : Philosophical Lib. $3.75.

O'Dea, Thomas F. *American Catholic Dilemma. An Inquiry into the Intellectual Life.* Introd. by Gustave Weigel, s.j. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1958. Pp. xv + 173.

Though this book is mainly a sociological analysis and must be judged on that score, some basic suppositions are philosophical in character (and some, as is to be expected, theological). One is the nature of the "intellectual"; the author holds that an intellectual is one who is doing original work in the sciences, humanities, and arts. Another is the social role of such an intellectual specialist; the author sees this role as essentially ambiguous, in that his leadership is both necessary and beyond the competence of the rest of society and so exposed to suspicion. In addition, the author has some excellent remarks on the teaching of philosophy.

Oesterreicher, John M. (ed.). *The Bridge.* New York: Pantheon Books, 1958. Pp. 383. $4.50.

Ogden, C. K., and Richards, I. A. *Meaning of Meaning.* [Reprint.] New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.; Mar., 1959. $2.25.

Ogden, C. K. *Bentham's Theory of Fictions.* Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co.; Mar., 1959. $1.75.

Ong, Walter J., s.j. *Ramus and Talon Inventory.* Harvard: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 558. $10.00.

This inventory lists the original and revised editions of the printed works of Peter Ramus and Omer Talon, together with the present location or major locations (if the copies are still extant). Works are also briefly described, and the relationships of various revisions is pointed out. In addition, there is a descriptive catalogue of the

Ramist controversies and a checklist of the editions and compendia of Rudolph Agricola's *Dialectical Invention.*

The volume should be obtained by all college and research libraries.

———. *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. xix + 408. $10.00.

This is a study of the thought of Peter Ramus and of the movement known as Ramism. The book begins with a general location of Ramism as an intellectual movement, a brief account of his life, and some remarks about his so-called "reform." Next comes a scholarly, though very compact, discussion of the background: the medieval logic and its movement toward quantification, the logic of Rudolph Agricola, the medieval arts Scholasticism (sharply distinguished from the scholasticism of the theologians), and the role of teaching in the schools. The third part of the book is the analysis of Ramism itself: the dialectic and its functions, the developments through controversy, the importance of method, and the Ramist rhetoric. In a final chapter, the diffusion of Ramist works and doctrine is studied.

The book is amply documented (notes, pp. 321-73; bibliography, pp. 377-91). There is also a detailed index.

Those interested in the history of philosophy, science, humanism, and ideas will find this book valuable and stimulating. Not only does it treat a man and a movement largely unknown, but its author is at pains to understand the movement in terms of larger contexts: the moving forces, the implications for knowledge and culture, the nature of knowledge and the image of man.

Ortega y Gacet, José. *Man and Crisis.* Trans. from the Spanish by Mildred Adams. New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1958. Pp. 217. $4.50.

Orynski, Wanda. *Hegel.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; May, 1959. $3.75.

Papay, Joseph L. *Metaphysics in Process.* Florham Park, N.J.: author [137 Upper Saddle River Road], 1958. Pp. 211. Paper, mimeographed, $3.00.

This is an experimental edition of a textbook prepared by a professor of philosophy at St. Peter's College, Jersey City. The author believes that metaphysics is best taught and learned the way it was first discovered. Hence the philosophical ideas and arguments are developed out of the history of philosophy from Thales to Aristotle. The book is divided into two main divisions, pre-Socratic and Socratic.

In expounding the doctrine of Thales, the author brings out the basic notion of philosophy and its special characteristics. Through Heraclitus and the Eleatics, he develops the problem of the one and the many, and the basic notion of change. In the Atomists he brings out the distinction between science and philosophy more clearly, and discusses the nature of philosophical compromise.

The most extensive section is that on Plato and the problems of Platonism. Here the author discusses many of the basic problems of the Aristotelian metaphysics. In addition, he shows how the Platonic and Aristotelian views on metaphysics flow into, are connected with, other areas of philosophy and life. The section on Aristotle draws together into a systematic organization the metaphysical ideas previously discovered and explained. An appendix gives a chart of the interrelation of the Aristotelian concepts.

Parke, Nathan Grier, III. *Guide to the Literature of Mathematics and Physics including Related Works on Engineering Science.* 2nd rev. ed. New York: Dover Pubns., 1958. Pp. xviii + 436. Paper, $2.49.

This is a revision of a bibliography first published in 1947. It is

intended principally for students and should be very helpful. In a general introductory section, the author explains methods of study and the use of reference materials. He has also a brief but helpful description of the nature of a scientific discipline. The general section includes likewise rules and hints for further research, the building up of a bibliography, and an introduction to the various bibliographical tools which are available. The major part of the book consists of the bibliography proper; each section is preceded by a brief, clear statement of the subject. The section on the philosophy of mathematics and physics is not exhaustive, but it does list a good number of the basic works.

PARKER, T. H. L. *Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God.* Rev. ed. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1958. $3.00.

PASCH, ALAN. *Experience and the Analytic: A Reconsideration of Empiricism.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. 1958. Pp. 291. $6.50.

PATTERSON, ROBERT LEET. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion.* New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1958. Pp. 342 $4.50.

PEGOTCHE, C. B. G. *Logosophy.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Feb., 1959. $3.75.

[PEIRCE, CHARLES SANTIAGO SANDERS.] *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce.* Vol. 7, *Science and Philosophy;* Vol. 8, *Reviews, Correspondence and Bibliography.* Ed. Arthur W. Burks. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 429, 364. $8.00 each.

‡ PETERS, R S. *The Concept of Motivation.* New York: Humanities Press, 1958. Pp. 166. $2.50.

‡ *Philosophy and Ethics.* New York: Collings, 1958. Pp. 339. $4.50.

PIAGET, JEAN. *Judgment and Reasoning in the Child.* [Reprint.] Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co.; Mar., 1959. $1.50.

PLATO. *Complete Works.* Abridged. Ed. Henry L. Drake. [Reprint.] Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co.; Mar., 1959. $2.25.

———. *Phaedo.* Trans. R. S. Bluck. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Mar., 1959. Paper, $1.25.

——— . *The Republic.* 2nd ed. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1958. Pp. 426. Paper, $1.00.

POINCARÉ, HENRI. *Value of Science.* Trans. George Bruce Halsted. New York: Dover Pubns.; Jan., 1959. Paper, $1.35.

‡ POLE, DAVID. *The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein.* New York: Essential Books, 1958. Pp. 142. $2.50.

POLLARD, WILLIAM G. *Chance and Providence.* New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1958. Pp. 190. $3.50.

POPPER, KARL R. *Logic of Scientific Discovery.* New York: Basic Books; Mar., 1959. $7.50.

Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method, and Philosophy. Ed. Sidney Hook. New York: New York Univ. Press; May, 1959. Pp. 288. $5.00

‡ *Psychology.* Rev. ed. New York: Collings, 1958. Pp. 359. $4.50.

Psychology: A Study of a Science. Ed. Koch. Study 1: *Conceptual and Systematic.* Vol. I: *Sensory, Perceptual and Physiological Formulations.* New York: McGraw-Hill; January, 1959. $9.75.

———. Vol. II: *General Systematic Formulations, Learning, and Special Processes.* January, 1959. $10.00.

———. Vol. III: *Formulations of the Person and the Social Context.* March, 1959.

‡ RAHMAN, FAZLUR. *Prophecy in Islam; Philosophy and Orthodoxy.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. 118. $3.50.

RANDALL, JOHN HERMAN, JR. *The Role of Knowledge in Western Religion.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. Pp. 157. $3.50.

RANK, OTTO. *Beyond Psychology.* New York: Dover Pubns.; Mar., 1959. Paper, $1.75.

Reese, William. *Ascent from Below: An introduction to Philosophical Inquiry.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.; Apr., 1959.

Regis, L. M. *Epistemology.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1959.

Reichenbach, Hans. *Philosophy of Space and Time.* Trans. Maria Reichenbach. [Reprint.] New York: Dover Pubns.; Mar., 1959. Paper, $2.00.

Reiser, Oliver L. *The Integration of Human Knowledge.* Boston: Porter Sargent, 1958. Pp. [xii] + 478. $8.00.

The author contends that knowledge must be synthesized, and he considers this to mean that ultimately there is only one knowledge. In his first two chapters he discusses the problems which seem to make a synthesis urgent—these problems are practical as well as theoretical, political and social as well as individual. In his theory, knowledge is a "temple" whose one base is a composite of theory of knowledge, scientific method, and semantics; its pillars are the various sciences; its single cap, unifying all, is philosophy. With this structure in mind, chapters three to eight take up various aspects of the base. In these chapters, guiding principles are semantics, operations' research, mathematics, field theory, and intuition. In the remaining chapters (9 to 13) the notions of the philosophy held by the author are detailed: induction, causality, and emergence (related to intuition), the field theory of matter with its pantheistic cosmic energy, the notion of society as a kind of superorganism with a "world-brain," and finally the description of the ideal man as the creative imagination of the cosmic reality.

The author calls this system a "scientific humanism"—"humanism" in that the highest manifestation of the one being which is cosmic energy is man; "scientific" in that science is the only source and tool of knowledge. When all sciences and arts, including politics, are "reduced" to physics, it turns out that the physicists are taken over by the politicians of the electromagnetic society.

In a laudatory foreword, Professor Giorgio de Santillana wonders whether the world as explained and prophesied by Professor Reiser would not be "an air-conditioned nightmare," or whether this book is Proclus brought up to date. Perhaps it is Proclus with Hegel as read by Feuerbach, master-minding a planned society by means of an electronic brain.

Reith, Herman, c.s.c. *The Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas.* Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1958. Pp. xvii + 403. $5.50.

This book consists of two parts, the exposition (pp. 1-199) and English readings from Aristotle and St. Thomas (pp. 200-395). The author begins by demonstrating the dependence of metaphysics on the philosophy of nature (for the existence of its formal subject), as well as the distinction of metaphysics from all other sciences. He next takes up the analogy of being, laying most stress on the analogy of proper proportionality. Various chapters then deal with substance and accidents, potency and act (in general, and also in regard to essence and existence, though the proof of the distinction of these principles is deferred), the transcendentals, the principles of knowledge and the causes (in the treatment of which the author speaks of the principle of causality and the principle of final causality), and, in the final chapter, the origin and end of all (a chapter on the "Five Ways" of St. Thomas; in connection with the Third Way the real distinction between essence and existence is proved).

The readings are arranged according to chapters and are quite extensive. There are separate subject indices to the text and to the readings.

The style is somewhat complex and heavy. The text itself quotes

many passages from St. Thomas. There is no indication, either in text or in the readings, that the chronological relationships of passages have any doctrinal significance.

Rexine, John E. *Solon and his Political Theory.* New York: William-Frederick Press, 1957. Pp. 21. Paper, $1.00.

Rice, Eugene F., Jr. *The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Dec., 1958. $4.50.

Rieff, Philip. *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist.* New York: Viking Press; Mar., 1959. $6.00.

Riley, Woodbridge. *American Philosophy.* [Reprint.] New York: Russell & Russell, 1958. Pp. 605. $8.50.

River, J. Paul de. *Crime and the Sexual Psychopath.* Springfield: Charles C Thomas, 1958. Pp. 384. $6.75.

Role of the Christian Philosopher, The. "Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association," Vol. XXXII. Washington. Office of the Secretary of the Association, 1958. Pp. 266. Paper, $3.50.

The topics of the major papers contained in this volume were previously reported in The Modern Schoolman, XXXV (1958), 286. For special attention, the presidential address on causality by the Reverend Allan B. Wolter, o.f.m., can be cited. Father Wolter points out in detail the difficulties raised by modern logicians against considering the so-called "principle of causality" to be simply analytic. He also shows the problems concerning its first discovery by the mind and its epistemological justification.

The "round table discussions" are listed under the heads that have become traditional in the meetings of the association. In the area of logic, Professor Henry B. Veatch pointed out some difficulties and inadequacies in logic as metaphysics, while the Reverend Joseph T. Clark, s.j., contended that modern logic as logic was a very useful refinement of traditional logic. In the area of the philosophy of nature, the Reverend J. Athanasius Wiesheipl, o.p., discussed the relations between St. Albert the Great and the Oxford Platonists; and the Reverend Melvin A. Glutz, c.p., contended that the philosophical study of man and scientific psychology need to be integrated into one discipline. In the area of moral philosophy, the Reverend Thomas J. Higgins, s.j., discussed and criticized modern attempts to define the good; and Professor Desmond J. Fitzgerald examined the state-of-nature theories of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the area of metaphysics, Professor Ralph M. McInerny presented the claim that just as Jaspers's philosophy made metaphysics as a science impossible, so the denial by some Thomists that *esse* can be properly conceived makes metaphysics equally impossible; the Reverend Edmund W. Morton, s.j., studied St. Thomas's texts on the relation of the possible to being. In the area of the history of philosophy, the Reverend S. Y. Watson, s.j., treated univocity and analogy of being in Duns Scotus; and Professor Thomas P. McTighe analyzed the meaning of *complicatio* and *explicatio* in Nicholas of Cusa. In the area loosely called "philosophical problems," the Reverend Robert F. Harvanek, s.j., gave his views on the meaning of the Church's emphasis on Thomism, in which he concurred with Cardinal Ehrle and Franz Pelster, s.j.; and the Reverend Hunter Guthrie, s.j., urged the use of the problem method in teaching philosophy.

Runes, Dagobert D. *Pictorial History of Philosophy.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; May, 1959. $15.00.

———. *Treasury of World Philosophy.* [Reprint.] Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co.; Feb., 1959. $3.95.

Russell, Bertrand. *Marriage and Morals.* [Reprint.] New York: Bantam Books; Mar., 1959. Paper, 50¢

———. *My Philosophical Development.* New York: Simon & Schuster; Mar., 1959. $3.50.

———. *Problems of Philosophy.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press; Mar., 1959. Paper, $1.25.

[Saint-Simon, Claude Henri.] *The Doctrine of Saint-Simon.* Trans. from the French with notes and introd. by Georg G. Iggers. Preface by G. D. H. Cole. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. Pp. 333. $4.95.

Sarton, George. *A History of Science: Hellenistic Science and Culture in the Last Three Centuries B.C.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Feb., 1959. Pp. 544. $11.00.

Scheffler, Israel (ed.). *Philosophy and Education.* Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1958. Pp. 312. $5.75.

[Schopenhauer, Arthur.] *Selections.* Ed. DeWitt H. Parker. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons; Jan., 1959. $1.00.

Schopenhauer, Arthur. *The World as Will and Representation.* Trans. E. F. J. Payne. Preface by C. A. Muses. Indian Hills, Colo.: Falcon's Wing Press, 1958. Vol. I, pp. xxxvi + 534; Vol. II, pp. vii + 687. Set, $17.50.

The only previous translation of this work (by Haldane and Kemp) was published in 1883-86, prior to the critical editions of Deussen and Hübscher, and in it some passages were omitted. The present translation is complete and is based on the latest printing of Hübscher's edition. The translator has also thoughtfully provided translations for the various foreign language quotations that Schopenhauer and his earlier translators were able to presume could be readily understood. In general, the translation is excellent.

Professor Muses, in his preface, gives a very general evaluation of the significance of Schopenhauer's work, stressing his moral sincerity. The translator's introduction is more specific and quite helpful. There is a very detailed index (II, 647-87), which is one of the greatest advantages of this new translation.

‡ Schreech, Michael Andrew. *The Rabelaisian Marriage.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958. Pp. 151. $5.50.

‡ Schrodinger, Erwin. *Mind and Matter* "Tarner Lectures," 1956. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 110. $2.75.

[Seneca, Lucius Annaeus.] *The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca.* Trans. from the Latin with introd. by Moses Hadas. Garden City, Doubleday & Co. Pp. 269. Paper, 95¢

Seward, Georgene S., and Seward, John Perry (eds.). *Current Psychological Issues.* New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1958. Pp. 368. $6.00.

Sheen, Fulton J. *God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy.* Garden City: Doubleday & Co.; Sept., 1958. $1.25.

Shepherd, A. P. *Scientist of the Invisible. An introduction to the Philosophy of Rudolf Steiner.* New York: British Book Centre; Feb., 1959. $3.25.

Sittler, Joseph. *The Structure of Christian Ethics.* Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press; Oct., 1958. Pp. 96. $2.50.

‡ Smith, J. Maynard. *The Theory of Evolution.* New York: Penguin Books, 1958. Pp. 320. Paper, 85¢

Smith, Vincent Edward. *The General Science of Nature.* Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co.; 1958. Pp. xiii + 400. $5.25.

This is an introductory college textbook on the philosophy of nature. The author calls it "the general science of nature" to indicate its relationship to the "particular" sciences of nature (both therefore being parts of one single science). He maintains that, since human knowledge progresses from the vague and general

to the clearly explicit and specific, the general part of science is presupposed for the particular and should precede it in the order of learning.

Having discussed the nature and distinction of sciences (largely in terms of the orders of abstraction), the author considers mobile being as the subject of the science of nature and follows this with a discussion of method. He turns then to the analysis of mobile being. First is the discussion of change, the first contraries (possession and privation), and their subject. Then comes the discussion of form and primary matter, followed by the study of matter as ground of motion. Having established this point, the author re-examines his definition of the science of nature in terms of nature as internal principle of motion and rest. This is followed by a discussion of the relation between physical and mathematical sciences of nature. Then come the causes: matter and form, agent, and final cause; chance is given a full discussion, and so is the final cause (where the argument for finality includes evidences of external finality). Then come chapters on motion, place (including a defence of natural place), time, the kinds of motion and its parts; the final chapter is a proof for the existence of the First Mover.

The author's style is clear and easy to understand. An excellent feature is the inclusion of readings at the end of each chapter which illustrate divergent views on the problem of the chapter. Each chapter also has excellent review questions. Notes to each chapter supply the place of bibliographies, and the general index at the end is detailed enough to be a real help to the student.

Solberg, Winton U. (ed.) *The Federal Convention and the Formation of the Union of the American States.* New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. cxviii + 409. Paper, $1.75.

The documents collected in this book are the declaration of rights of the Stamp Act Congress, two letters concerning the Townshend Acts, the declaration and resolutions of the First Continental Congress, selections from the acts of the Second Continental Congress, the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation and the Annapolis Convention, resolutions for a Federal Convention, Madison's notes on the debates at the convention (selections), the Constitution with its resolutions and transmittal letters, ratification of the Constitution, and the amendments to the Constitution. Appendix I is a biographical register of the delegates to the Federal Convention; Appendix II consists of population estimates.

The long introduction gives the historical background of the Revolution and the formation of the United States. The editor tries to indicate the various currents of thought that influenced the delegates and other leaders, and to give a balanced appraisal of the strength of the various influences. A great amount of historical scholarship is here presented in simple, direct form, with enough documentation to provide sources for even advanced study. There is also a brief, selective bibliography. In addition, the editor has written introductions to the selections and has annotated passages which need further clarification.

The book should be eminently valuable not only for courses in constitutional history but also for political theory and the history of political philosophy. The book is sturdy and beautifully printed.

Spinoza, Baruch. *Selections.* 2nd ed. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1958. Pp. 479. Paper, $1.00.

Stallknecht, Newton Phelps. *Strange Seas of Thought.* [Reprint.] Bloomington: Indian Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 301. $5.00.

Stebbing, Susan. *Philosophy and the Physicists.* [Reprint.] New York: Dover Pubns.; Feb., 1959. Paper, $1.65.

———. *Thinking to Some Purpose.* Baltimore: Penguin Books; Feb., 1959. Paper, 95¢

Sterling, Richard W. *Ethics in a World of Power.* Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press. Pp. 329. $6.00.

Strauss, Leo. *Thoughts on Machiavelli.* Glencoe: Free Press, 1958. Pp. 348. $6.00.

Sultan, Paul. *Right-to-Work Laws. A Study in Conflict.* Los Angeles: Inst. of Industrial Relations, Univ. of California Press, 1958. Pp. 141. Paper, $1.75.

Suzuki, Daisetz T. *Zen and Japanese Culture.* New York: Pantheon Books; Mar., 1959. $7.50.

Tallet, Jorge. *The Absolute Being.* Trans. Beverly Thurman and the author. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. Pp. 74. $3.00.

This book was first published in Spanish in 1955. The author holds that the absolute being is the sum total of all existence, including not only definite actuality but also possibility and even the absence of actuality. He maintains that only two ideas are absolutely certain: the phenomenal "I" and the absolute being. He considers that both of these are known by intuition. He thinks that existence itself has absolute validity and is its own justification. With regard to definite facts—those discovered by science—he holds that we cannot have complete certitude and that the methods of discovering definite facts cannot be applied to the universe as a whole. It is his view that the absolute being is by its nature imprecise and vague, and that consequently philosophy, which has as its object this being, is likewise vague. For this reason he eschews precise statement and elaborates his thoughts in a meditative essay.

Terruwe, A. A. A. *Psychopathic Personality and Neurosis.* New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons; Nov., 1958. $3.50.

‡ Thompson, Ruth D'Arcy. *D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson, the Scholar-Naturalist, 1860-1948.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 240. $4.00.

Thurstone, L. L. *The Measurement of Values.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicogo Press, 1959. Pp. 384. $7.50.

Tillotson, Geofrey. *Pope and Human Nature.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 282. $4.00.

Vallon, Michel A. *Apostle of Freedom. The Life and Teaching of Nicholas Berdyaev.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Apr., 1959. $6.00.

Vann, Gerald, o.p. *The Paradise Tree: On Living the Symbols of the Church.* New York: Sheed & Ward; Mar., 1959. $3.50.

Versfeld, Marthinus. *A Guide to the City of God.* New York: Sheed & Ward, 1958. Pp. 153. $3.00.

Virchow, Rudolf Ludwig Karl. *Disease, Life, and Man.* Trans. from the German and with introd. by Lelland J. Rather. Stanford, Stanford Univ. Press. Pp. 281. $5.00.

Watts, Alan W. *Nature, Man, and Woman.* New York: Pantheon Books, 1958. Pp. 221. $3.95.

———. *Supreme Identity. An Essay on Oriental Metaphysic and the Christian Religion.* New York: Humanities Press; Feb., 1959. $3.25.

‡ Wedberg, Anders. *Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics.* New York: Humanities Press, 1959. Pp. 154. $5.00.

Weitz, Morris. *Problems in Aesthetics.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1959.

Weizsäcker, C. F. von. *The History of Nature.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1959. Pp. 160. $1.25.

‡ Weldon, T. D. *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.* 2nd ed. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 344. $5.60.

‡ Wetter, Gustav A. *Dialectical Materialism.* New York: Frederick A. Praeger; Dec., 1958. $10.00.

White, Morton. *Religion, Politics, and the Higher Learning.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Jan., 1959. Pp. 144. $3.50.

Whitehead, Alfred North. *An Introduction to Mathematics.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 196. Paper, $1.50.

———. *The Function of Reason.* Boston, Beacon Press. Pp. 90. Paper, $1.25.

‡ Winch, P. *The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy.* New York: Humanities Press, 1958. Pp. 139. $2.50.

Winspear, Alban Dewes *Who Was Socrates?* New York, Russell & Russell. $3.00.

‡ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *The Blue and Brown Books.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1958. Pp. 199. $6.00.

Wolfson, H. A. *The Philosophy of Spinoza.* New York: Meridian Books, 1958. $1.95.

Wolstenholme, B. E. W., and O'Connor, Cecilia M. (eds.) *Ciba Foundation Symposium on the Neurological Basis of Behavior, in Commemoration of Sir Charles Sherrington, 1857-1952.* Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1958. Pp. 412. $9.00.

Woodworth, Hugh. *Sanity, Unheard Of.* Victoria, B.C.: Sumas Pub. Co., 1958. Pp. 109. $3.00.

Impressed by the unhappiness suffered by very many people and enthusiastic about the "solution" offered by semantics, the author offers a diagnosis and a cure. Unhappiness, it is urged, is due to anxiety, fear, and ego-consciousness (self-consciousness, in the derogatory sense of that term), and these in turn are the products of thought. The solution is to abandon forethought and memory and to act without reflection upon one's action, to live in complete spontaneity, much as an animal or young child.

As is so often the case, the practical advice is a partial truth—many people "get in their own way," and so their action is never wholehearted and consequently not a source of joy to themselves or to their fellows. But the author presents his advice in the form of a sweeping generalization and rests it on an equally sweeping theoretical basis. The Rousseauvian "noble savage" appears to be still haunting.

[Wright, Chauncey.] *The Philosophical Writings of Chauncey Wright. Representative Selections.* Ed. Edward H. Madden. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xxii + 145. Paper, 80¢

Wright was one of the important formative figures in American philosophy. Though he lacked the synthesizing genius of Peirce and the popular appeal of James, his philosophy of science is better because it stays closer to evidence and avoids rhetorical amplification. In other ways, he has some of the limitations common to the group —the impression, for example, that Kant can be refuted empirically.

The introduction is relevant and clear. The selective bibliography and the editorial footnotes are invaluable guides to the student. The edition is excellent, from the choice of selections to the printing and binding.

Zuurdeeg, Willem F. *An Analytical Philosophy of Religion.* Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1958. Pp. 320. $4.75.

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